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ABSTRACT 
In 2006, Mexico President Felipe Calderon, with U.S. assistance, launched a military 
campaign to combat Violent Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations in attempt to 
disrupt the growing violence throughout Mexico. The result has been an uncontrollable 
drug war that has claimed more lives within Mexico than the U.S. campaigns in 
Afghanistan and Iraq combined. From the U.S. perspective, the threat of spillover 
violence emanating from Mexico is a wicked problem and one that polarizes the political 
discourse. Conflicting opinions about the meaning of spillover violence has driven 
misrepresentation of events and evidence that fuel the political narrative. Therefore, no 
metric for analysis can be put in place to accurately document and monitor the threat to 
the U.S. homeland. The term spillover violence, instead, has become the focal point. This 
research seeks to find a broader framework outside of political agendas that provides 
analysis in a systematic manner rather than focusing on semantics.  
This research identifies gaps in the understanding of how spillover violence is 
defined and captured within the current construct; examines current criminal metrics used 
to classify and report violent crime statistics; and evaluates the scope of Texas border 
operations dedicated toward violent crime crossing the Southwestern border. 
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I.  THE PROBLEM SPACE 
We have far-reaching geographic, economic, and demographic ties to 
Mexico and Central America, as well as a compelling national security 
interest in cooperating with governments in the region to succeed in our 
battle against transnational crime.1 
– National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy  
The global insatiable appetite for drugs is driving a multi-billion dollar industry2 
in Mexico, the ramifications of which are bringing both violence and illegal entry of 
drugs, persons and weapons into the United States.3 Violence in Mexico has 
exponentially increased and is crossing the Southwest border into the United States.4 The 
United States has embraced a law enforcement-centric strategy to combat the spreading 
threat while Mexico is leveraging its military resources. In 2006, Mexico President Felipe 
Calderon, with assistance from the United States through the Merida Initiative, launched 
a military campaign to combat violent groups in attempt to disrupt the growing violence. 
The result has been an uncontrollable drug war that has claimed more lives within 
Mexico than the U.S. campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq combined.5  
A. DIFFICULTIES WITH DESIGNATIONS 
Who are these violent groups? There are multiple designations attributed to the 
organizations responsible for violence in Mexico that is extending into the United States 
but there is no standard label for them. The nomenclature is quite varied and these 
                                                 
1 Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 42. 
2 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in 
Identifying and Measuring Spillover, by Kristin M. Finklea, William J. Krouse, and Marc R. Rosenblum, 
CRS Report R41075 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, August 25, 
2011), 3.  
3 Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, 3. 
4 Texas Fusion Center, Texas Gang Threat Assessment 2010 (Austin, TX: Texas Department of Public 
Safety, 2010), 16. 
5 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Violent Drug Market in Mexico and Lessons Learned from Colombia,” 
Foreign Policy at Brookings 12 (March 1, 2009): 1. 
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organizations are subsequently labeled for their mainstay—drugs. Throughout this 
research process, these groups are commonly labeled drug cartels,6 drug trafficking 
organizations,7 organized crime organizations,8 foreign terrorist organizations,9 and 
transnational criminal organizations.10  
Labeling these groups as cartels is by far the most common nomenclature used in 
the literature. The term appears to be universally accepted and defines the operational 
environment with drug trafficking and the violence that associates such activities. 
However, labeling these Mexican groups as cartels is inaccurate, as they do not conspire 
with each other to set drug prices, or agree on trafficking routes and territory control as 
did their Colombian predecessors, the Cali and Medellin cartels.11 In fact, they operate in 
quite the opposite manner and are in constant conflict that gives rise to the violence. 
The label drug trafficking organization was common and even elevated to violent 
drug trafficking organization because it “recognizes that the primary (though certainly 
not the only) undertaking of these organizations is drug trafficking, that they are 
organized, and that a significant and salient part of the problem they cause is a direct 
result of the violence they perpetuate.”12 
                                                 
6 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Mexico’s Drug Cartels, by Colleen W. 
Cook, CRS Report RL34215 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, 
October 16, 2007), 12. 
7 Peter Chalk, Profiles of Mexico’s Seven Major Drug Trafficking Organizations (West Point, NY: 
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2012). 
8 Sam Logan, “Mexico’s Uppermost Threat is Organized Crime,” mexidata.info, May 1, 2006, 
http://mexidata.info/id869.html. 
9 Rafael Romo, “Mexican Drug Cartels Considered Terrorists? CNN World, April 15, 2011, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-04-15/world/cartels.terror_1_beltran-leyva-cartels-familia-
michoacana?_s=PM:WORLD. 
10 President of the United States, Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing 
Converging Threats to National Security (Washington, DC, 2011), 9. 
11 Christopher Paul, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, and Colin P. Clarke, The Challenge of Violent Drug-
Trafficking Organizations (Arlington, VA: Rand, 2011), 13. 
12 Ibid. 
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Recent U.S. legislation requested these groups be designated foreign terrorist 
organizations.13 This is a notable departure and for the first time labels these groups as 
terrorists, perhaps creating a pathway to defining them within the parameters of national 
security.  
As these groups have diversified their business operations away from focusing on 
drugs and into other illicit activities (human and weapons trafficking, kidnapping, 
corruption, and extortion) their designation becomes more obscure. The recent trend in 
literature favors labeling these groups transnational criminal organizations. The U.S. 
government understanding of this definition simply applies a transnational nexus to 
organized criminal organizations. The United Nations mentions that organized criminal 
groups become transnational when illicit activities are committed in more than one state, 
or committed in one state while planned or directed in another, and involves organized 
criminal group from more than one state or has substantial effects in another state.14  
Classifying these groups as transnational criminal organizations requires 
information and intelligence on their strengths, weaknesses, and overall characteristics, 
and assumes they present national and international security problems.15 The gap 
between defining a terrorist organization and transnational criminal organization has 
more to do with intent, but in no way diminishes the potential threat. Terrorist 
organizations use more of an ideology and “deliberate creation and exploitation of fear 
through violence or threat of violence…meant to instill fear within, and thereby 
intimidate, a wider target audience that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an 
entire country, a national government…or public opinion in general.”16 Legislation 
offered before Congress by Congressman Michael McCaul asserts they “operate in the 
                                                 
13 Congressman Michael T. McCaul, “112th Congress, 1st Session H. R. ll, to Direct the Secretary of 
State to Designate As Foreign Terrorist Organizations Certain Mexican Drug Cartels, and for Other 
Purposes, in the House of Representatives, Mr. McCaul Introduced the Following Bill,” March 28, 2011, 
http://mccaul.house.gov/uploads/FTO%20Bill_xml1.pdf. 
14 The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Crime; Tom Barry, “Transnational Criminal 
Organizations -- In Search of a Definition,” Border Lines Blog, entry posted June 27, 2011, 
http://borderlinesblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/transnational-criminal-organizations-in.html. 
15 Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Organisations International Security,” Survival: Global 
Politics and Strategy 36, no. 1 (January 1, 1994): 315. 
16 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York, NY: Colombia Press, 2006), 199. 
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same manner as al Qaeda, the Taliban or Hezbollah, each sharing a desire and using 
tactics to gain political and economic influence.”17 The situation in Mexico is certainly 
reminiscent of these claims, but the intent may have more to do with monetary 
enrichment than political influence.  
These Mexican groups are using terrorist tactics, but are they terrorist 
organizations? Evidence supports they use fear-induced intimidation and coercion against 
the civilian population, government authorities (both in Mexico and the United States), 
rival groups and political leaders for the sole purpose of making money. These groups are 
slow to engage fully on the U.S. side of the border as they have done in Mexico, quite 
simply because it is not within their financial interest to bring the weight of U.S. 
authorities onto their operations.18 They intimidate and kill freely to further their 
financial cause and appear to regenerate as quickly as they are dismantled. Historically, 
when drug trafficking operations are hindered by law enforcement or military operations, 
these groups switch to other illicit activities, such as human and weapons smuggling, 
kidnapping and extortion to further their business plans.  
For the purpose herein, the framework used to describe these groups is Violent 
Mexican Transnational Criminal Organization (VMTCO). The designation offers a clear 
picture of the transnational nexus these groups afford within Mexico and to the U.S. 
Southwestern border, as well as the widespread and brutal violence they inflict without 
pause. 
VMTCOs are responsible for widespread violence throughout Mexico and the 
ensuing spillover into the United States. For example, the Los Zetas VMTCO has already 
targeted U.S. authorities and the civilian populace. On February 15, 2011, two U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents were assassinated on the Mexico side of 
                                                 
17 Congressman Michael T. McCaul, “McCaul Seeks to Classify Mexican Drug Cartels as Terrorists,” 
March 30, 2011, http://mccaul.house.gov/common/popup/popup.cfm?action=item.print&itemID=1161. 
18 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in 
Identifying and Measuring Spillover, 8. 
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the border in their government vehicle.19 The motive of the assassination has not yet been 
made public, but this was the first attack on U.S. authorities directly attributed to a 
VMTCO since 1983.20 In contrast, on May 14, 2011, the Los Zetas VMTCO was 
responsible for the massacre of 72 Guatemalan migrant farm workers—men, women and 
children, several of which were decapitated—that clearly communicated “the killing of 
the farm workers was intended to spread fear and send a distinct message: If you cross 
the Zetas you will pay.”21 These incidents serve as reminders about the violent nature of 
VMTCOs toward the civilian populace in both the United States and Mexico. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Mexico continues to experience higher levels of violence largely due to the 
continuous power play for control of lucrative smuggling routes throughout Mexico and 
into the United States.22 Widespread corruption and murder of law enforcement officials 
and their families led President Felipe Calderon to mobilize the Mexican military against 
VMTCO activities to maintain stability in the country.23 Mexico’s current strategy is to 
reduce the level of violence, not necessarily eliminate VMTCOs.24  
1. Violence 
2010 and 2011 have produced the highest levels of violence Mexico has 
experienced and is largely due to the continuous power play for control of smuggling 
                                                 
19 Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents Jamie Zapata and Victor Avila were assassinated 
during the course of official duties. Jared Taylor, “Zetas Likely Behind Fatal Attack on ICE Agents in 
Mexico; Brownsville Native Killed,” The Monitor, February 16, 2011, 
http://www.themonitor.com/articles/agents-47143-ice-mcallen.html. 
20 Ibid. Drug Enforcement Agency special agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena was kidnapped, tortured 
and murdered by the Guadalajara cartel on February 9, 1983.  
21 STRATFOR, Implications of the Massacre in Guatemala’s Peten Department (Austin, TX, May 
2011). 
22 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking 
Organizations: Source and Scope of Rising Violence, by June S. Beittel, CRS Report R41576 (Washington, 
DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, August 3, 2012), 9. 
23 STRATFOR, Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date (Austin, TX, 2011). 
24 Aimee Rawlins, “Mexico’s Drug War,” Backgrounder (December 13, 2011). 
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routes into the United States by VMTCOs.25 The violence in Mexico has reached 
unprecedented levels; since 2006, there have been over 50,000 deaths directly attributed 
to VMTCO violence in Mexico (not totally inclusive of VMTCO-on-VMTCO 
violence)26 with 11,600 in 2010 alone (a 70% increase from 2009).27 Preliminary 
statistics released under pressure by the government of Mexico indicate 12,903 deaths as 
of October 2011 and do not account for the final quarter of the year; at the time of the 
tally, the government of Mexico attributed 47,453 deaths to the drug war.28 The rise in 
murders is also accompanied by “increasing brutality, intimidation, and attacks on 
members other than those directly involved in the illicit drug trade (e.g., security forces 
and governmental officials).”29 
VMTCOs take advantage of modern social media and communication methods to 
intimidate the populace, rival VMTCOs and government agencies, and are breeding 
insecurity and fear with a terrorist methodology. Their increasing reliance on the use of 
beheadings showcased on YouTube is one powerful example. Beheadings resurfaced on 
the Western landscape in 2002 with the beheading video of Central Intelligence Agency 
operative Daniel Pearl by radical Islamists. The intent of beheadings in this construct is a 
form of asymmetrical warfare meant to show the strength of a much smaller force and 
“counter to what the civilized West can tolerate.”30 Videotaped beheadings by radical 
Islamists may have globalized this tactic, as it appears VMTCOs are increasingly relying 
on this modality to send a message. 
                                                 
25 STRATFOR, Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date. 
26 STRATFOR, Mexican Drug War 2011 Update (Austin, TX, 2011). 
27 STRATFOR, Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date. 
28 Cory Molzahn, Viridiana Ríos, and David A. Shirk, Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis 
Through 2011 (San Diego, CA, 2012), 9. 
29 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in 
Identifying and Measuring Spillover, 15. 
30 Lisa J. Campbell, “The Use of Beheadings by Fundamentalist Islam,” Global Crime 7, no. 3–4 
(November 1, 2006): 602. 
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The progression of VMTCO beheadings first began as a way to send a message to 
rival VMTCOs.31 It progressed quickly to show a sign of force and intimidation tactic 
against Mexican government forces. However, on September 6, 2006, members of the La 
Familia Michoacána VMTCO entered a crowded discothèque and lobbed five severed 
heads onto the dance floor.32 This marked the first time in Mexico that beheadings were 
used as propaganda and designed to instill fear in the local populace.33 These trends all 
continue present day as beheadings of rival VMTCO members, government officials, and 
innocent bystanders seem a common occurrence. In the first two weeks of May 2012 
alone, there were 81 VMTCO related beheadings in Mexico.34  
Other forms of VMTCO communication are also synonymous with terrorist 
tactics in that they are didactic, used for recruitment, and purely coercive.35 VMTCOs 
use narcomantas—written messages on blankets or large billboards strategically placed in 
plain sight—to post propaganda claiming or disavowing recent atrocities to coerce the 
civilian populace,36 rival VMTCOs,37 the U.S. government,38 and the Mexican  
 
                                                 
31 Members of the Guatemalan Special Forces, known as the “Kaibiles” used decapitations in 
Guatemala. In 2000, members of Kaibiles were recruited by and became the enforcement arm of the Gulf 
Cartel. Called Los Zetas, they split from the Gulf Cartel in 2010 to form a separate cartel. 
32 George W. Grayson, La Familia Drug Cartel: Implications for U.S.-Mexican Security (Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), vii. 
33 Ibid., viii. 
34 Will Grant, “Mexico Violence: Fear and Intimidation,” BBC News, Latin America and Caribbean, 
May 14, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-18063328. 
35 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 199. 
36 The Knights Templar has populated the Michoacán area with narcomantas proclaiming its (new) 
presence. Of note, these messages offer commitment to the civilian populace and protection from rival 
cartels and corrupt law enforcement. STRATFOR, Mexican Drug War 2011 Update.  
37 On May 4, 2012, 14 bodies of alleged Los Zetas members bodies were found in Nuevo Laredo with 
a narcomanta from the Sinaloa cartel claiming responsibility. George Friedman, “Mexico Plagued by 
Narcomantas and Body Dumps,” The Cutting Edge, May 24, 2012, 
http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=73739&pageid=20&pagename=Security. 
38 On July 27, 2011, members of the Juarez cartel placed narcomantas threatening DEA and U.S. 
Consulate members with decapitation or dismemberment if they continued “meddling.” Alejandro 
Martínez-Cabrera, “New Banner Threatens US Agents,” El Paso Times, August 24, 2011, 
http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ci_18743465. 
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government.39 VMTCOs also continue to quell media reporting and are increasing 
attacks on journalists and innocent civilians that marks a departure from past practices of 
refraining from targeting civilians.40 
Violence in Mexico and the threat of ensuing spillover violence41 into the United 
States are concrete problems resulting directly from VMTCO drug, human and weapon 
trafficking activities. Spillover violence threatens the United States. At face value, 
spillover violence entails violence crossing the U.S. border from Mexico, but there is no 
universally accepted definition. Its mere mention appears to immediately polarize the 
political (and public) discourse, and without a definition it is a subjective—yet 
powerful—label used by both sides to subjugate the true impact of VMTCO activities 
into the United States. 
2. Drugs 
Illicit trafficking operations across the Southwest border are allowing illegal entry 
of drugs, persons and weapons. VMTCOs are the major suppliers of drugs into the United 
States from Mexico.42 In 2010, U.S. law enforcement drug seizures along the Southwest 
border included 2,535,003 pounds of cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin and marijuana,43 
yet federal law enforcement estimates indicate only 10 to 20 percent of the total amount 
of available drugs were actually seized.44 Drug trafficking is the most profitable venue 
                                                 
39 The El Milenio cartel placed narcomantas in the town of Jalisco threatening the Governor with an 
all-out war on the civilian populace if he did not remove certain rival factions from within his police force. 
Conciencia Radio, (n.d.), http://www.concienciaradio.com/narco_mensaje_gdl.htm. 
40 In June 2012, unidentified cartels launched a series of car bombings at media outlets along the 
Texas-Mexico border in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas and Monterrey, Nuevo Leon. Pro8News, “Wrap-Up: 
Nuevo Laredo Friday Car Bomb,” June 30, 2012, http://www.pro8news.com/news/local/Wrap-Up-Nuevo-
Laredo-Friday-Car-Bomb-160946865.html. 
41 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in 
Identifying and Measuring Spillover, 12. 
42 Ibid., 5. 
43 Customs and Border Protection fiscal year 2011 report. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
“United States Border Patrol, Apprehensions/Seizure Statistics—Fiscal Year 2011,” (n.d.), 
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/usbp_statistics/fy_profile_2011.ctt/fy_
profile_2011.pdf. 
44 House Committee on Homeland Security, A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the 
Southwest Border (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 3. 
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for the VMTCOs45 and they have established far-reaching bases of operation deep within 
the United States by way of the Southwest border.46 Currently, there are over 1,000 cities 
with known VMTCO activity within the United States.47 
 
 
Figure 1.   VMTCOs’ Spreading Influence into the United States48 
                                                 
45 Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, 26. 
46 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in 
Identifying and Measuring Spillover, 8–10. 
47 National Gang Intelligence Center, National Gang Threat Assessment: Emerging Trends 
(Washington, DC, 2011). 
48 Jonathon Rivait and Richard Johnson, “Graphic: Mexican Drug Cartels’ Spreading Influence, 
Invasion of the Drug Cartels,” National Post, July 13, 2012, 
http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/07/13/mexican-drug-cartels-spreading-influence-graphic/. 
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3. Human Trafficking and Smuggling 
VMTCOs are branching out their operations and human trafficking has become a 
profitable venue. Similar to drug interdiction statistics, federal law enforcement estimates 
only 10% to 30% of illegal aliens are apprehended.49 In contrast, a 2012 analysis of 
government statistics completed by the Pew Foundation suggests illegal immigration into 
the United States is holding steady due to economic challenges from the U.S. recession, 
an increase in border management efforts, and changes in social demographics in 
Mexico.50 The analysis claims a “net-zero” gain, meaning illegal immigrants are still 
entering the United States while others choose to return to Mexico. However, the study 
does not account for illegal immigrants who repeatedly cross the border (both ways) for 
drug, weapon or human smuggling and trafficking nor does it take into consideration 
special interest aliens. 
Specific to this discussion on human trafficking is the classification of special 
interest aliens, given to the rising influx of other than Mexican nationalities51 entering the 
United States through Mexico. In 2005, 1.2 million illegal aliens were apprehended of 
which 165,000 were other than Mexican; 650 of which were from one of 35 special 
interest countries “designated by the intelligence community as countries that could 
export individuals that could bring harm to our country in the way of terrorism.”52 The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reported a 41% increase in apprehension of 
special interest aliens along the Texas-Mexico border from 2002–2006 including 
numerous accounts of special interest aliens from countries, such as Lebanon, Iran, Syria, 
and Jordan, as well as Islamic radical organizations, such as Hezbollah.53 DHS maintains 
                                                 
49 House Committee on Homeland Security, A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the 
Southwest Border, 3. 
50 Jeffrey Passell, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana-Gonzales-Barrera, Net Migration from Mexico Falls to 
Zero—and Perhaps Less (Washington, DC: The Pew Foundation, 2012). 
51 Other than Mexican (OTM) is an official CBP designation. 
52 House Committee on Homeland Security, A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the 
Southwest Border, 2–3. 
53 Ibid., 27. 
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463,000 illegal aliens were apprehended on the Southwest border in 201054 and claims 
this is due to fewer persons attempting to illegally cross the border. However, in 2010, 
there were 663 special interest alien apprehensions.55 Despite a 60% reduction in illegal 
alien apprehensions from 2005–2010, special interest alien apprehensions remained 
constant. There is a financial incentive for special interest alien human smuggling 
operations as they can bring upwards of $60,000 per alien.56 
4. Weapons Trafficking 
Weapon trafficking across the U.S. Southwest border is a significant issue as well. 
DHS reports 6,800 weapons57 were seized during fiscal years 2009 and 2010 on the 
Southwest border resulting in a 22% increase from 2008. The 2010 National Drug Threat 
Assessment indicates that the large portion of these weapons are traveling from the 
United States into Mexico, arming VMTCO members and contributing to the escalating 
violence in Mexico.58 Although the assessment indicates VMTCOs have a role in this 
weapons smuggling, it stops short of assigning percentage of involvement. 
VMTCOs are no longer limited to drug trafficking, although it continues to be 
their lead source of revenue. Human and weapons trafficking are proving to be fertile 
territory as these organizations expand their empires. 
                                                 
54 Department of Homeland Security, “Secretary Janet Napolitano, before the Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: “Securing the Border: Progress at the Federal Level,”” May 
3, 2011, http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1304459606805.shtm. 
55 Dorothy Pullo, “U.S. Customs & Border Patrol Statistics,” Judicial Watch, February 17, 2011, 
http://www.judicialwatch.org/files/documents/2011/cbp-foia-response-02172011.pdf. 
56 House Committee on Homeland Security, A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the 
Southwest Border, 14. 
57 Department of Homeland Security, “Testimony of Commissioner Alan Bersin, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection, Before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, “Money Laundering and 
Bulk Cash Smuggling Along the Southwest Border,” March 9, 2011, 
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1299698014975.shtm. 
58 Supplied by the National Drug Intelligence Center, which was closed on June 15, 2011 by the 
Department of Justice per Congressional mandate. U.S. Department of Justice, “National Drug Intelligence 
Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2010,” Document ID: 2010-Q0317-001, February 2010, 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs38/38661/. 
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5. Transnational Gang Affiliation 
The definition of spillover violence is more complicated than equating violence in 
Mexico with synonymous acts within the United States. There are second and third order 
effects stemming from the VMTCO framework and a discussion about the VMTCOs 
must include commentary on their affiliation with transnational gangs. The VMTCOs 
engage in various illicit trafficking and violent crime activities for the sole purpose of 
making money and have positioned themselves as wholesale distributors after learning 
from the experiences of the Cali and Medellin cartels in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
Colombian cartels did not want to become involved directly in street-level operations and 
risk increased law enforcement actions. Instead, they approached the Bloods and Crips 
(rival gangs in Los Angeles, California) to become retail distributors of illegal drugs.59 
The resulting alliances devastated Los Angeles neighborhoods as violence increased 
dramatically.60 VMTCOs have followed suit and recruited Hispanic street gangs, prison 
gangs and outlaw motorcycle gangs to become retail distributors. VMTCOs, however, 
have taken the relationship one step further and are using the different gangs for 
smuggling operations, debt collection, and enforcement.61  
Federal law enforcement estimates VMTCOs utilize relationships with over 20 of 
these groups62 but the gangs do not show particular allegiance to any one VMTCO and 
sometimes act as regional outlets for multiple VMTCOs at a time.63 The VMTCO 
                                                 
59 Robert J. Kelly, Jess Maghan, and Joseph D. Serio, Illicit Trafficking (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 
Inc., 2005), 15. 
60 Independent Lens, “Crips and Blood: Made in America,” (n.d.), 
http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/cripsandbloods/timeline.html. 
61 Supplied by the National Drug Intelligence Center, which was closed on June 15, 2011 by the 
Department of Justice per Congressional mandate. United States Department of Justice, National Drug 
Intelligence Center, “Attorney General’s Report to Congress on the Growth of Violent Street Gangs in 
Suburban Areas, National-Level Gang-Drug Trafficking Organization Connections,” April 2008, 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs27/27612/national.htm. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Texas Fusion Center, Texas Gang Threat Assessment 2010, 17. 
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relationship with transnational gangs also serves to broaden money-laundering 
opportunities for illicit trafficking proceeds.64  
The 2010 Texas Gang Threat Assessment states that transnational gangs are the 
most significant organized crime threat to the State of Texas because of their affiliation 
with VMTCOs.65 The Texas Department of Public Safety defines transnational gangs “as 
gangs that regularly and systematically conduct criminal activity across national borders 
…the essence of transnational gangs is that they transcend international boundaries in 
order to conduct criminal activity.”66 The 2010 Texas Gang Threat Assessment asserts 
that VMTCOs are increasing their reliance on transnational gangs to spread illicit 
trafficking operations throughout the United States in at least 1,000 of the cities cited 
previously. As the relationship fosters, illicit trafficking operations and the violence that 
accompanies them are expected to increase.67 These transnational gangs already account 
for up to 60% of crime in major cities in Texas.68 The relationship is purely and 
beneficially financial; the gangs have access to wholesale drug prices while VMTCOs 
expand their network. Under the direction of VMTCOs, transnational gangs extend drug, 
human and weapons smuggling operations into the United States,69 act as enforcers and 
commit “acts of violence” on behalf of VMTCOs, and “have a history of carrying out 




                                                 
64 House Committee on Homeland Security, A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the 
Southwest Border, 15. 





70 Ibid., 11. 
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 The transnational Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) transnational gang has ties to 
VMTCOs dating back to at least 200571 and extensive connections in 
Central America (they originated in El Salvador), Mexico and the United 
States. Therefore, they provide VMTCOs with an appetizing and large 
network for smuggling operations.72 
 Historically, MS-13 has close ties with the (rival) Sinaloa and Los Zetas 
VMTCOs. MS-13 serves in a “mercenary capacity” for both of these 
VMTCOs in addition to performing kidnappings and assassinations.73 
 MS-13 members are actively recruited by these rival VMTCOs for their 
propensity for violence and dedication in an attempt to mount VMTCO 
strongholds on the Texas-Mexico border.74 
Conceptualizing an acceptable definition of spillover violence will need to include 
the nexus to transnational gangs. This complicates the discourse surrounding the topic, as 
many transnational gang members are U.S. citizens.  
6.  Actions and Policies 
In 2006, Mexican President Calderon launched Operation Secure Mexico to 
combat police and political corruption in cities with a significant VMTCO presence.75 
Operation Secure Mexico has deployed over 50,000 military troops throughout Mexico to 
combat VMTCO operations.76 Mexican military forces have been more successful than 
local law enforcement against VMTCOs for three reasons. First, their exposure to 
coercion and bribery (whether monetary or physical) is drastically reduced compared 
with local law enforcement77 because the military is able to rotate resources so that forces 
are not tied to one location and subject to corruption.78 However, the military has been at 
                                                 
71 House Committee on Homeland Security, A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the 
Southwest Border, 12. 
72 Texas Fusion Center, Texas Gang Threat Assessment 2010, 19. 
73 Ibid., 30. 
74 Ibid. 
75 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Mexico’s Drug Cartels, 10. 
76 Rawlins, “Mexico’s Drug War.”  
77 STRATFOR, Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date. 
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war with VMTCOs since 2006 and the risk of corruption is now significantly higher.79 
Second, the Mexican military is better trained to match VMTCO military tactics. 
VMTCOs have amassed military weaponry and utilize military tactics to overwhelm their 
opposition whether it is rival VMTCOs, civilians or government forces.80 Third, the 
Mexican military is nationally mobile, united and equipped. However, the Mexican 
military is limited by its size and ability to cover the entire country and VMTCOs have 
taken advantage of geography and challenged military resources to be in all places at 
once. 
President Calderon’s military success has not been without controversy. Military 
involvement might be a leading factor in the recent escalation of VMTCO violence81 and 
the military’s use with internal security matters is a topic of legislation. In early 2010, the 
Mexican Congress passed addendums to the National Security Law that attempts to 
clarify the use of military forces in a domestic capacity. One of the driving forces behind 
this legislation stems from an increase in human rights violations committed against 
civilians by members of the military.82 Proponents of the legislation maintain the military 
will be used as a “last resort” and “there will be much more certainty about what the 
Armed Forces can and can’t do; there will be much more protection for innocent citizens 
caught in the middle of this fight against organized crime.”83 President Calderon has 
since introduced the Federal Police as a newly structured law enforcement agency84 
designed to assist military operations with civil matters.85 Opponents, however, maintain, 
                                                 
79 STRATFOR, Mexican Drug Wars: Bloodiest Year to Date.  
80 House Committee on Homeland Security, A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the 
Southwest Border, 22–23. 
81 Rawlins, “Mexico’s Drug War.” 
82 Human Rights Watch, Neither Rights Nor Security: Killings, Torture, and Disappearances in 
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“that neither citizens nor Congress will have any say on how and when military force is 
used”86 and accentuates that the fight against VMTCOs is taking its toll on Mexico. 
The United States, in cooperation with Mexico, has increased efforts on the 
Southwest border in many ways to counter VMTCO activities. For example, to date, the 
United States has appropriated $700 million to the Merida Initiative, a long-term effort 
put in place to bolster regional assets and capabilities needed to reduce criminal activity 
in Mexico.87 The state of Texas launched Operation Rio Grande88 to assist Mexico with 
combating border crime.89 DHS launched the Secure Border Initiative90 to increase 
enforcement personnel on the border. In addition, the National Guard deployed 6,000 
personnel to the Southwest border under Operation Jump Start from 2006–2008 to assist 
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency with administrative duties, intelligence 
and observational gathering services, and infrastructure projects.91 In turn, the U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection agency focused on increasing personnel and 
concentrating on law enforcement activities geared toward illegal immigration. National 
Guard service members were specifically used in supportive roles and restricted from 
directly contributing to law enforcement duties due to anticipated political tensions 
                                                 
86 Latin America News Dispatch, “Mexico’s National Security Law Proposal Prompts Human Rights 
Concerns,” April 28, 2011, http://latindispatch.com/2011/04/28/mexicos-national-security-law-proposal-
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87 Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, 1. 
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88 House Committee on Homeland Security, A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the 
Southwest Border, 32–33. 
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http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/2006/12/121106-OJS_success.aspx. 
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between the U.S. and Mexico governments.92 In May 2010, due to the success and 
tangible results of Operation Jump Start,93 President Obama redeployed 1,200 National 
Guard troops to the Southwest border under the same guise.  
The United States and Mexico must continue working together to combat 
VMTCO activities and violence. The United States and Mexico relationship is based on 
“trade and investment, migration and tourism, environment and health concerns, and 
family and cultural relationships.”94 Open, secure and free routes of trade are imperative 
between the two countries. “Mexico is the second most important trading partner of the 
United States, and this trade is critical to many U.S. industries and border 
communities.”95 VMTCO activities are threatening this relationship; hence, the need to 
directly and vigorously address the violence and other associated problems those 
activities create. 
C.  THE THREAT 
The cartels “operating today along the Southwest border are far more 
sophisticated and dangerous than any other organized criminal groups in 
American law enforcement history.”96 
Transnational gangs and subsequent illegal aliens affiliated with VMTCOs 
purposefully smuggle drugs, persons and weapons into the United States. The violence 
that exists in Mexico around these operations accompanies them inside the Southwest 
border. Violence is used as mediation in disputes in Mexico because trafficking activities 
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already operate outside legal parameters.97 This violence has slowly moved toward and 
across the Southwest border. “Spillover violence into the United States may look similar 
to the recent surge of violence in Mexico…this increasing violence has been seen through 
a rise in both the number of drug trafficking-related murders and the brutality of the 
murders. It is also taking the forms of increasing intimidation and fear, attacks on security 
forces, assassinations of high-ranking officials, growing arsenals of weapons, and 
indiscriminate killing of civilians.”98  
The symbiosis of VMTCOs and transnational gangs will increase the level of 
violence on the Southwestern border.99 Transnational gangs are smaller, but evolving 
versions of VMTCOs in that “the cartel [VMTCO] connections also increase the 
likelihood that gangs in Texas will expand their involvement in Mexican cartel violence 
that occurs in the state, either by carrying it out on behalf of the cartels or creating gang 
rivalries that mirror the gang alliances with competing cartels.”100 Thus, VMTCO 
activities are spreading violence across the Southwestern border and directly affecting the 
United States. 
D. POLITICAL DISCOURSE 
Texas shares the majority of the U.S. Southwestern border with Mexico and is 
center stage in the battle to combat VMTCOs. Discourse—meaning, verbal and written 
rhetoric—over the security of the border infuses Texas politics at the local, state and 
national levels. Local border-town law enforcement agencies lead the charge against 
securing communities from the effects of spillover violence, but offer competing 
narratives on its true impact. The state has mobilized resources to its southern flank and 
spent over $200 million dollars in federal grant funds toward securing the border. Texas 
Senators, Congressional members, Mayors and the Governor’s Office fuel the political 
discourse with grandiose claims and insouciant rhetoric about the effects of spillover 
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98 Ibid., 13. 
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violence on Texas communities. The federal government has exponentially increased 
resources to the Southwestern border and maintains it is safer now than ever before. 
Mexico continues to establish itself as a dominant economic force, is the third 
largest trading partner for the United States, and seeks to expand its economic position 
globally. Mexico will continue to globalize through legitimate economic forums, such as 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Pacific Alliance with South 
America and East Asia.101 The literature indicates Mexico, like the United States, is a 
prideful nation and will not be denigrated by its northern neighbor. Recent events 
between the two nation’s leaders have confirmed this and that violence caused by 
VMTCOs is center stage within the political discourse. 
E. METRICS 
Without an agreed upon definition of spillover violence, there continues to be 
conflicting opinions and misrepresentation of events and evidence to serve the political 
goal of those using the term. Thus, no metric for analysis can be put in place to accurately 
gauge and monitor the threat to the U.S. homeland. Without this, metric funding and 
resource allocations are difficult to appropriately place in the contemporary homeland 
security fiscal environment. 
Using an inexact term like spillover violence as a singular determinant on the 
effects of VMTCO operations into Texas is dangerous. This failed method does not 
reflect the strategic thinking needed, nor does it fit with the goals that each side in the 
political debate have stated they would like to achieve—that of a safer homeland.102 The 
term has become the focus and this research seeks to find a broader framework outside of 
the political agendas involved to provide critical analysis in a systematic manner rather 
than continuing the redefinition game. 
In addition to arson, murder and assault (hallmarks of the VMTCO framework 
within Mexico), other criminal and problematic activities include corruption of public 
                                                 
101 Kelly, Maghan and Serio, Illicit Trafficking, 26. 
102 Both sides of the border want safer homelands but may not be willing to sacrifice political 
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officials, kidnapping, and extortion. How these crimes are reported is being used to either 
bolster or obviate the real impact of the violence taking place so that the term rather than 
objective metrics become the story. Violence is an obvious and tangible threat of 
VMTCO activities moving across the Southwest border. Corruption, kidnapping and 
extortion used together with violence exhibits a much greater strategic threat to the U.S. 
way of life—less than 50 miles from the Southwestern border—than many want to 
recognize. Effectively labeling the issue “spillover violence” can no longer be the focus 
for finding metric to deal with this challenge. Finding an effective analytical framework 
for decision making related to the myriad of border issues may allow the United States to 
get beyond what has become a political football with real and dangerous consequences. 
F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. How to Effectively Judge the Threat of VMTCO Violence 
The term “spillover violence” has been used to describe a threat to the United 
States that is emanating from Mexico as a result of the drug war with VMTCOs. The 
term has become politicized and manipulated to bolster political agendas rather than 
effective homeland security positions. In an effort to replace the political discourse with 
research-based analysis, this thesis asks, could an analytical framework for decision 
making based on available open-sourced evidence help homeland security decision 
makers more effectively judge issues impacted by VMTCO violence?  
2. How to Accurately Measure VMTCO Violence 
A corollary to this overarching question of analytical frames questioned above is 
the issue of how to identify a metric that captures the impact of VMTCO violence and its 
impact in the United States. Does approaching this issue through analytical frameworks  
rather than political terms like “spillover violence” make it possible to identify metrics 
for measuring the impact of VMTCO violent crime along the Southwestern border? What 
might those be? 
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G. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS 
The methods used within this thesis to collect and analyze information 
surrounding what has been widely called spillover violence include the literature review, 
an examination into the process of criminal metrics, and an evaluation of Texas border 
security operations. The literature review is used to identify gaps in the understanding of 
how spillover violence is defined and captured within the current local, state and federal 
construct. The examination of criminal metrics reviews law enforcement methods to 
classify and report violent crime statistics. The evaluation of border security operations 
examines the cost, resources and scope of combating border violence and VMTCO 
activities. 
Data collected for this thesis is taken primarily from published open-source 
materials and news media. The VMTCO environment is dynamic and changing daily; 
therefore, media outlets are an important source. The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) program is identified within the literature as a 
method used to assert conclusions about spillover violence and crime. Data concerning 
rules and regulations of the UCR program, as well as annual crime indexes for Texas 
border cities and major metropolitan areas are taken directly from the UCR program 
database. 
The literature suggests that the state of Texas is experiencing significant violence 
and other impacts that follow from violence because of VMTCO conflict. The 
government conducts border operations to combat these current and potential future 
threats. Strategies, cost, resource allocation and metrics used to quantify the impact of 
VMTCO violence and crimes are obtained from public materials. 
This analysis includes a discussion about the terminology and origin of spillover 
violence rampant throughout the political discourse. An examination of various 
definitions and intentions is examined through the lens of rising violence. The analysis 




multiple layers of reporting requirements and how it may affect final crime metrics. 
Finally, the analysis also examines different components and tangible results of Texas 
border operations and how they are used for efficiency in documenting threats specific to 
VMTCOs. 
The goal of this thesis is to provide a framework for effective decision making 
related to how VMTCO violence is defined and measured relative to its use and impact 
within the political discourse. It examines existing methods of defining and 
characterizing spillover violence, and challenges UCR program methodology as the sole 
metric for determining VMTCO violence as it stands today. Furthermore, it offers a 
snapshot into Texas border operations related to the challenge in an effort to illustrate 
important issues that should be considered by Homeland Security decision makers in a 
structured and systematic manner—rather than based upon what has become politically 
charged language. An analysis of VMTCO violence relative to UCR program metrics, 
coupled with data from existing border operations, will be used to formulate 
recommendations and allow decision makers to pursue a safer homeland through 
analytical rather than political frameworks.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
For the U.S., the political measurement is based on perceptions about 
spillover violence along the border.103 
The literature review follows a thematic construct centered on spillover violence. 
Analyzing the historical progression of VMTCOs and the accompanying political 
narrative produces resultant layers at the international, national and state levels that help 
frame the discourse surrounding spillover violence in terms of homeland security. The 
literature is unanimous that the VMTCO threat and subsequent violence have increased in 
Mexico since the beginning of Calderon’s crusade against VMTCOs in 2006. However, 
once that discussion crosses the Southwest border into Texas, the literature becomes 
polarizing, inferring that either spillover violence has increased dramatically or the 
situation is politically inflated and there is no threat at all.104 A majority of the literature 
surrounding U.S.-Mexico relations concentrates more on immigration policy, valuable 
economic trade and drug reduction efforts. Central to this thesis is a focus within the 
literature on the topic of spillover violence and whether it presents a threat to the United 
States. The threat posed by VMTCOs directly against the citizens of Mexico has 
drastically increased since 2006, but the political discourse surrounding U.S. and Mexico 
relations dates far earlier. Historically, both nations’ strategic policy decisions have 
affected one another whether intentional or not. Jose Cuevas’ discussion on balloon 
effects categorizes these second-order effects as a result from pressure (e.g., strategic 
policy) applied to a specific location, causing those activities to migrate to another 
location and continue.105 Nowhere is this more present today than along the 
Southwestern border as Mexican President Calderon wages a battle against VMTCOs. 
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Hyper-violent battles for control of lucrative plazas—gateways into Texas through border 
towns—are one of the many impacts of the Mexican drug war. The political discourse 
surrounding these balloon effects often becomes a blame game between the two nations 
as Mexico blames the United States for poor gun control laws and an insatiable appetite 
for drugs (demand) while the United States blames Mexico for an inability to curtail drug 
supply and violence. During an international summit on economic cooperation and trade 
between Mexico, the United States and Canada, Mexico President Felipe Calderon 
warned that VMTCOs are operating freely on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border and 
blamed the rise in violence and deaths in Mexico on lax U.S. automatic gun control 
laws.106 
Despite a significant increased VMTCO presence in Texas,107 the literature and 
political discourse are neither concrete nor universal in agreement regarding spillover 
violence along and within the Southwest border. VMTCO activities are dynamic and 
changing daily. Therefore, this literature review focuses on the most current literature 
available across academic theses, scholarly works, governmental publications and 
testimony, and news media. The literature review addresses the origins of past and 
present political discourse, spillover violence claims, and the current and future threat.  
A. HISTORY 
A review of the literature must include a brief, albeit simplistic, historical account 
of the progression of contemporary borders that began during the Texas Revolution and 
continued into the Mexican-American War. The Texas Revolution had its roots in 
Mexican immigration policy into the Mexican State of Coahuila y Tejas,108 aspirations 
amongst Texians (U.S. immigrants in Coahuila y Tejas) for separate statehood, and 
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Mexico’s transition from a federalist model of government to centralism.109 The Treaties 
of Velasco were signed on April 14, 1836 and ended the Texas Revolution, but neither 
the treaties nor the geographic boundaries were recognized by Mexico. This ultimately 
led to the Mexican-American War 10 years later.110 Following the Texas Revolution, the 
Republic of Texas sought statehood within the rapidly expanding United States. 
Proponents of the annexation cited the idea of manifest destiny—divine sanction for 
territorial expansion—of the United States. President James K. Polk attempted 
negotiations with Mexico to establish geographical borders at the Rio Grande River as 
opposed to the Nueces River claimed by Mexico.111 Mexico refused to negotiate and the 
U.S. military was ordered into Matamoros at the Rio Grande River to establish the new 
border by force. Mexico considered this an act of war, pre-emptively attacked U.S. 
forces112 and the Mexican-American War ensued.113 This war ended with the signing of 
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on February 2, 1848; thus, ceding modern day borders 
of California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas to the United States.114 Mexico’s defeat 
remains a milestone in the relationship between the two countries when considering 
contemporary rhetoric surrounding Mexican national pride versus U.S. imperialism. 
It is important to remember these historical accounts because they play a pivotal 
role in contemporary political and cultural views on efforts along the Southwest border, 
particularly when these efforts involve sovereignty issues between either nation. U.S. 
military Generals McCafferey and Scales support this claim in their Texas Border 
Security: A Strategic Military Assessment by stating VMTCOs take advantage of this 
situation and form narco-sanctuaries within the United States in attempt to further illicit 
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activities and avoid Mexican military enforcement.115 The Rio Grande acts as an area of 
quasi-sanctuary and incursions of military and law enforcement personnel from either 
country are strictly forbidden, thus making it somewhat of a safe haven for VMTCO 
members. Suspected VMTCO members intentionally drive vehicles into the Rio Grande 
River when fleeing Texas law enforcement and are met with boats in the river from 
accomplices on the Mexico side. The Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) has 
witnessed over 60 such acts since 2009 and terms this common VMTCO evasive tactic a 
“splashdown.”116  
The geography of the border has become somewhat of a sticking point for 21st 
century political discourse. According to The National Security Archive at The George 
Washington University, “American Presidents have used the border, in particular, as a 
bargaining chip, holding it hostage during tricky or troublesome negotiations when the 
United States was determined to get its way.”117 President Nixon’s 1969 Operation 
Intercept is one such example that still affects 21st century political discourse today. In 
an effort to launch a “concerted frontal attack on the illegal importation into and 
subsequent illegal sale and use of marijuana, narcotics and dangerous drugs in the United 
States,”118 and force the Mexican government to go after drug smugglers, a coordinated 
U.S. border security initiative essentially shut down the entire 2,000 mile Southwest 
border with minimal level of consultation with the government of Mexico. To make 
matters worse, the operation was planned and implemented without the knowledge of the 
State Department that was responsible for diplomatic relations with Mexico. The 
government of Mexico was furious, as were several U.S. agencies.119 G. Gordon Liddy, a  
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senior advisor to the Treasury Department at the time, stated that Operation Intercept was 
“an exercise in international extortion, pure, simple, and effective, designed to bend 
Mexico to our will.”120  
Interestingly, reactions from opponents to Operation Intercept and the inaugural 
“war on drugs” were centered more on the potential negative effects to legitimize 
economic trade and immigration due to long lines and closed points of entry rather than 
the original intent of disrupting the flow of drugs into the United States. This same 
narrative continues today (almost verbatim) as President Obama and President Calderon 
advocate for an open border. What is missing is a frank discussion on the threat or 
presence of spillover violence between the two countries. A 2012 travel advisory from 
the United States State Department warned Americans to avoid several tourist 
destinations in Mexico due to drug violence. The warning cited a 343% increase in 
Americans murdered while in Mexico, as well as an increase in kidnappings since the 
inception of Calderon’s war against VMTCOs.121 This spike in violence is synonymous 
with an exponential rise of violence in Mexico. The state of Texas followed suit and 
cautioned travelers against traveling to Mexico for Spring Break. Mexico was furious. 
“Mexican Ambassador to the United States Arturo Sarukhan chastised Texan officials for 
their advisory. ‘As their number one trading partner and largest export market, Mexico 
believes Texas should be able to more objectively evaluate facts, providing nuance and 
context, and in doing so, dispel the notion that their motivation is a clear-cut political 
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to the importance of economic trade and tourism. In turn, President Obama sent his 13-
year old daughter (along with 12 friends and 25 Secret Service agents) to Mexico for 
Spring Break vacation.123 
The history of relationships between VMTCOs and previous Mexican 
government administrations also bears mentioning. The Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI), formed in the late 1920s following the Mexican Revolution, remained the 
dominant centralized leadership for the majority of the 20th century. During the PRI’s 
tenure, it ruled with a hegemonic mindset and “maintained order and stability through 
both implicit and explicit arrangements” with nefarious groups that included drug 
trafficking organizations. 124 Essentially, this symbiotic relationship permitted drug 
trafficking organizations to operate with impunity in respective regions while granting 
PRI affiliates both political stability and financial gain. In Perceptions and Attitudes 
about Corruption and Democracy in Mexico, John Bailey and Pablo Paras address how 
corruption became an institutionalized societal mainstay during this time.125 Political 
corruption was known and understood by the Mexican citizenry, but did not involve the 
level of violence experienced in Mexico today. The violence seems to be the tipping 
point in the modern Mexican political narrative as current and potential political leaders 
are claiming to end widespread violence throughout the country by stopping the use of 
the military against VMTCOs. Today’s discourse does not openly admit to returning to 
the historical relationship between the PRI and VMTCOs, but it is evident within the 
literature that violence and the VMTCO threat are out of control and in need of 
attention.126  
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Two events during the 1980s are important to note concerning the relationship 
between the PRI, the United States, and VMTCOs. Most significantly, the assassination 
of U.S. Drug Enforcement Agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena in Guadalajara, Mexico on 
February 9, 1983, exposed the corrupt relationship between the PRI, Mexican Federal 
Security Directorate,127 Mexican Federal Judicial Police, and the Guadalajara cartel. The 
resulting U.S.-led investigation publically attributed Camarena’s murder to the political 
elite, Mexican security forces, and the Guadalajara cartel. While this relationship was not 
surprising in Mexico, it was unthinkable within the United States. U.S. pressure was 
formative in fracturing the symbiotic relationship between the PRI, police and 
Guadalajara cartel ultimately allowing smaller VMTCOs to rise to power.128 In line with 
the theory on balloon effects, the Guadalajara cartel split into the Juarez, Tijuana and 
Sinaloa VMTCOs, all of which have a substantial role in the present day hyper-violence 
and corruption. The Vicente Carrillo Fuentes VMTCO—the Juarez VMTCO—is 
positioned within the second most violent city in the world.129 Violence in Ciudad Juarez, 
Chihuahua and the ramifications upon its border city, El Paso, Texas, are front and center 
in current political discourse. Despite rising violence in Juarez, DHS Secretary Janet 
Napolitano recently claimed El Paso, Texas as the safest U.S. city with no discernible 
spillover violence.130  
Second, the success of the U.S. counter-narcotic campaign against Colombian 
drug trafficking routes effectively shut down cocaine shipments into the United States via 
the Caribbean.131 The U.S. appetite for drugs persuaded the Colombians to start shipping 
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cocaine via Mexico into the United States. Thus, VMTCOs were placed in a more 
profitable role and subsequent strategic threat in drug trafficking throughout Mexico and 
into the United States. VMTCOs currently control cocaine shipments from South 
America into the United States. 
In 2000, challenging National Action Party (PAN) party delegate Vicente Fox 
won the Presidential election, ushering in democratic rule for the first time in more than 
70 years. While President Fox initiated the first military incursions against VMTCOs, an 
economic resurgence in 2006 allowed succeeding PAN President Felipe Calderon to shift 
the security focus of Mexico to a campaign on battling drug trafficking organizations. In 
2006, as a precursor to his National Security Strategy, Calderon launched a campaign 
against VMTCOs utilizing Mexican military forces, the effects of which are debated 
amongst politicians, scholars and Mexican citizens alike. Proponents indicate Calderon’s 
strategy has decimated top-tier leaders of the major VMTCOs in Mexico, weakening and 
fracturing some to a point that they are no longer a real threat. As proof, the Tijuana, 
Juarez and Gulf VMTCOs have lost significant control of their territories. Conversely 
and in line with Cuevas’ discussion on balloon effects,132 opponents attribute Calderon’s 
strategy to the enormous rise in violence and over 50,000 deaths, increased hyper-
violence in areas where VMTCOs battle for territorial control, and the spread of illicit 
activity (with subsequent hyper-violence) into new regions. However, according to a 
2011 Pew poll, while 45% of Mexicans think the government is “losing ground” in the 
fight against VMTCOs, 83% recommend further use of military action to control the 
situation.133 
Calderon’s military strategy is contested in the 2012 Mexico Presidential 
elections. Calderon is not eligible for re-election, but PAN party conservative nominee 
Josefina Vazquez Mota has pledged to continue Calderon’s strategy toward combating 
VMTCOs, and therefore, by default, some argue, increased violence in Mexico. The PRI 
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platform, however, is capitalizing on negative public reaction to increased violence. The 
PRI party nominee Enrique Pena Nieto has indicated he will reduce violence in the 
country by ending aggressive military deployments against VMTCOs in favor of a truce 
leading to some memorandum of understanding with one or more VMTCOs.134 This is 
vividly reminiscent of PRI politics during the latter half of the 20th century. This political 
discourse is not lost on the major VMTCOs as the Los Zetas VMTCO is attempting to 
influence the 2012 Presidential election through intimidation and violence, and the 
Sinaloa VMTCO is generally viewed to be the favorite of the PRI.135 Either way, 
VMTCOs are expected to indirectly (and perhaps directly) influence the outcome of 
political elections in Mexico. 
B. ISSUES 
Perhaps the most polarizing and sporadic discussion throughout the literature rests 
on what extent VMTCO violence is spilling over the Southwestern border. Spillover 
violence alone does not encompass the enormity of the VMTCO threat to Mexico and the 
United States. Rather, McGee, Joel and Edson contend in Mexico’s Cartel Problem: A 
System’s Thinking Perspective spillover is but one systemic enabler to a much larger 
network of issues with a genesis in both Mexico (economic underdevelopment, a 
dysfunctional educational system, corruption) and the United States (drug demand).136 
However, the Woodrow Wilson Center of International Scholars maintains neither the 
political nor public discourse view the VMTCO threat with a lens that sees beyond a 
perception of spillover violence and drug smuggling.137 The issue is further complicated 
by a convoluted political narrative that does not agree on the concept(s) or definition(s) of 
spillover violence. Discussions about spillover violence are camouflaged from headlines 
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as border literature focuses more on immigration policy, economic trade, security and 
drug reduction programs. DHS claims the Southwestern border is more secure now than 
at any time in its 87-year history and offers a montage of accolades to staffing levels on 
its website.138 Congressional testimony offers conflicting views on the scope of violence 
within the United States due to VMTCO activities. Testimony by DHS before the U.S. 
Senate states violent crime along the border is falling rapidly while increasing in 
Mexico.139 Yet, other Congressional testimony lies at the opposite end of the spectrum 
and claims spillover violence is so significant in both U.S. border towns and communities 
that VMTCO activity is a concern to homeland security.140 Therefore, the central claims 
within this thesis focus on an obvious gap in the literature as to what extent spillover 
violence is occurring, how it is defined, and if it will continue to get worse.  
The Merida Initiative is the largest Western hemispheric strategy and a $1.4 
billion aid package from the United States to Mexico and Central America designed to 
combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime.141 The Merida Initiative was 
funded for fiscal years (FY) 2007–2010 and centered around four pillars: disrupt 
organized crime operations, institutionalize the capacity to sustain the rule of law, create 
a 21st century border structure, and build strong and resilient communities.142 Although 
conceived by a previous administration, the Merida Initiative was instrumental in 
enabling President Calderon to launch his offensive against VMTCOs as initial funding 
was spent largely on equipment (such as helicopters) and training. According to scholar 
Dr. Richard Downie, this level of international cooperation against combating 
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transnational organized crime has resulted in the best U.S.-Mexico defense relations in 
decades.143 However, the violence has dramatically increased in Mexico since the Merida 
Initiative’s inception, corruption is still a problem and policy critics are surfacing. The 
Merida Initiative certainly appeared to accomplish the first pillar of disrupting organized 
crime, but not necessarily as anticipated given the dramatic increase in violence. Dr. Ray 
Walser and the Heritage Foundation maintain the political discourse is taking the Merida 
Initiative in the wrong direction.144 Violence in Mexico has reached unprecedented levels 
and is still plagued by police corruption and decreasing public support for current 
government policies toward combating VMTCO activities. Walser maintains the current 
U.S. political narrative has accepted blame for Mexico’s problems rather than take a 
tough stance to implement a strategic anti-narcotics plan in the Western Hemisphere, 
enhance law enforcement and military cooperation amongst the two countries, and 
address a national strategy policy focusing on diplomacy and reducing drug demand.145 
He maintains there is an impending confrontation with VMTCO activities and the 
accompanying violence that will continue to creep into U.S. border communities by 
“dangerous hybrid forms of ‘paramilitary terrorism’ with ‘guerilla tactics.’”146 The 
Congressional Research Service agrees and maintains the Merida Initiative operates 
under the premise that violence in Mexico is spilling over into the United States and “it is 
proving difficult for the United States and Mexico to overcome decades of mistrust in 
order to work together to implement Mérida.”147 The political discourse of this 
hemispheric strategy is challenged by both contemporary ramifications of the drug war 
and the history of the sovereignty of both nations. 
Official federal government reports are unanimous in declaring violence in 
Mexico is a potential threat to the United States, but the term “spillover violence” is 
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rarely used. The 2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime defines 
transnational organized crime as “those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who 
operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or 
commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities 
through a pattern of corruption and/or violence, or while protecting their illegal activities 
through a transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational 
commerce or communication mechanisms.”148 The report goes on to say transnational 
organized criminal organizations either use or threaten to use violence in order to further 
their activities, includes VMTCOs as a leading problem in the Western Hemisphere, and 
maintains the Southwestern border is “vulnerable.”149 Applying these statements toward 
VMTCO activities along the Southwestern border supports that spillover violence is 
occurring, yet it is not directly addressed within the report. Likewise, the 2009 National 
Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, obviously targeted directly toward 
VMTCOs, makes no mention of spillover violence. Rather, it aims to reduce “associated 
instruments of “violence,” suggesting that the term “spillover violence” is not an 
accepted term within the political narrative.150 DHS Secretary Napolitano supports this 
claim when she stated the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy is 
critical for U.S. efforts to stop “cross-border” violence.151 Again, the Secretary’s 
statement infers that cross-border violence—also known as spillover violence—is 
occurring and in need of a strategy to stop it, but refrains from using the term spillover. 
On the heels of a dramatic rise in violence along the Southwestern border, U.S. Customs 
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border security strategy since 2004 and the start of President Calderon’s military battle 
against VMTCOs. There is no mention of spillover violence in the 2012 border security 
strategy.152 Instead, it makes two casual references of the need to protect against cross-
border violence.  
Texas Border Security: A Strategic Military Assessment, a commissioned report 
by the state of Texas from two retired military commanders and academic scholars, paints 
a much more daunting picture that significantly widens the political discourse. It states, 
“living and conducting business in a Texas border county is tantamount to living in a war 
zone in which civil authorities, law enforcement agencies as well as citizens are under 
attack around the clock. The Rio Grande River offers little solace to the echoes of 
gunshots and explosions. News of shootings, murders, kidnappings, beheadings, mass 
graves and other acts of violence coming across the border go far beyond any definition 
of “spillover violence.”153 This claim is not supported in any manner by the 2012–2016 
Border Patrol Strategic Plan at the federal level and a prime example of the polarizing 
political discourse surrounding spillover across the border. 
The literature supports violence is increasing across the border when discussing 
the relationship between U.S. street and prison gangs and Mexican VMTCOs. The 2011 
National Gang Threat Assessment and Emerging Trends claims this relationship has 
caused an increase in violence along the porous Southwest border region “as US-based 
gangs seek to prove their worth to the drug cartels, compete with other gangs for favor, 
and act as US-based enforcers for cartels which involves home invasions, robbery, 
kidnapping, and murder.”154 The 2011 Texas Gang Threat Assessment agrees. For 
example, Barrio Azteca is a U.S. street gang (that recruits heavily in the U.S. prison 
system) centered in El Paso, Texas. Barrio Azteca is roughly 3,000 members strong and 
acts as the enforcement arm for Vicente Carrillo Fuentes VMTCO located in Juarez, 
Chihuahua. Barrio Azteca and the Vicente Carrillo Fuentes VMTCO operate in true 
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transnational form on both sides of the Southwestern border with documented hyper-
violence that includes murder, kidnapping, assault, and intimidation.155 As mentioned 
previously, El Paso, Texas and Juarez, Chihuahua are breeding grounds for political 
discourse centered upon the presence of spillover violence.  
Many government publications defer specific discussions on spillover violence to 
a 2011 Congressional Research Service report entitled Southwest Border Violence: Issues 
in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence. The report is direct and concludes there 
is neither an accepted definition of spillover violence nor a definitive method available to 
determine if and to what extent it is occurring.156 The authors attempt to balance 
anecdotal accounts of spillover violence with documented accounts from the FBI 
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) program and claim there is no way for analysts to discern 
what portion of violent crimes are attributed to spillover violence. What they omit is a 
problem in the Uniform Crime Reporting methodology and how violent crimes are 
chronicled, rather than a lack of spillover violence. What makes spillover violence 
anecdotal is the lack of a congruent framework in which to establish its existence. 
The FBI UCR program is used by pundits on both sides of the aisle to claim or 
disprove spillover violence. The 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment suggests 
spillover violence is not yet significant157 and cites a statistical analysis of the UCR 
program158 in U.S. cities with known VMTCO activity. However, recent Congressional 
testimony offers a contradictory account between the federal policy makers who advocate 
spillover violence is minimal or absent, and state and local law enforcement officials who 
claim otherwise.159 TXDPS Director Steve McCraw states the UCR program fails to 
include all aspects of known VMTCO tactics, techniques and procedures—such as 
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kidnapping, extortion, corruption, smuggling of humans and weapons, recruitment and 
affiliations with transnational gangs—within the term spillover violence and claims this 
oversight omits an accurate reflection of the threat.160 DHS Secretary Napolitano and El 
Paso Mayor John Cook recently claimed El Paso, Texas as the safest U.S. city of its 
size161 despite being opposite Juarez, Chihuahua, one of the most violent cities in the 
world.162 During Congressional testimony, McCraw states 2009 FBI UCR program data 
for El Paso was used to support Napolitano’s claim. According to McCraw, murders in El 
Paso, Texas are up 1,200% from 2010–2011 due to VMTCO violence.163 
This is not the only polarizing testimony before the U.S. Congress. The 111th 
U.S. Congress held over 20 hearings dealing with violence in Mexico and the threat to 
the United States and the 112th Congress shows a similar interest to monitoring the 
threat.164 Questions arise as to whether this should be a local public security issue or a 
national security threat.165 In testimony before the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper states VMTCOs are 
responsible for the hyper-violence in Mexico and Central America, but the United States 
is not likely to experience spillover violence from Mexico.166 Clapper maintains the 
violence is due to control of lucrative trafficking routes and widespread government 
corruption.167 In a position paper from the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, 
Gary Hale commends Clapper for his “objective and well-balanced review of the security 
situation facing both nations” and dispelling “the myth that violence is uncontrollably 
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spilling over and into the United States.”168 Hale admits there is spillover violence from 
Mexico, but asserts that it is only in border towns, usually between drug traffickers and, 
therefore, not a threat to the interior United States. He supports this claim with violent 
crime rates in major metropolitan cities like Detroit, Michigan and New Orleans, 
Louisiana that are significantly higher than any Southwestern border town.  
Clapper’s testimony, however, does not address the argument that control of 
lucrative trafficking routes between warring VMTCOs (and the subsequent cause of 
violence) occurs along Texas border plazas, such as Matamoras-Brownsville, Reynosa-
McAllen, Nueva Laredo-Laredo, and Juarez-El Paso. In each of these plazas, there is 
constant battle for control between the Gulf, Los Zetas and Sinaloa VMTCOs. In 
testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, 
Zapata County, Texas Sheriff Sigifredo Gonzales, Jr. stated there is constant spillover 
violence along Texas border counties that comes in the form of kidnappings, car jackings 
and auto theft, home invasions, shootings, threats and intimidation against civilians and 
law enforcement officers, human and weapons trafficking, and murders.169  
Later in his testimony, Clapper discusses how kidnapping and extortion 
“generates new and deep income streams for transnational criminal organizations 
(particularly in Mexico) and terrorist networks.”170 His reference to lucrative 
relationships between transnational criminal organizations (specifically VMTCOs) and 
terrorist organizations is not discussed in detail. A political counter-narrative offered by 
Congressman Michael McCaul attempts to designate VMTCOs as foreign terrorist 
organizations. McCaul introduced legislation on March 28, 2011 requesting six VMTCOs 
receive designation as foreign terrorist organizations: the Arellano Felix Organization, 
Los Zetas VMTCO, Beltran Leyva Organization, La Familia Michoacána, Sinaloa 
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VMTCO and Gulf VMTCO.171 The U.S. Department of State maintains foreign terrorist 
organization designations “play a critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an 
effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get 
out of the terrorism business.”172 The legislation maintains these six VMTCOs meet all 
three criteria to be characterized as a terrorist organization by arguing they are foreign 
organizations, they engage—or maintain the ability and intent to engage—in terrorist 
activity, and, this activity threatens U.S. national security.173 
In terms of VMTCOs emerging as a threat beyond transnational criminal 
organizations, testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western 
Hemisphere by academic scholar Dr. Robert Bunker notes VMTCOs are a criminal and 
spiritual insurgency and a threat far beyond (transnational) organized crime. Bunker’s 
testimony is more of an analysis for the political discourse that focuses on “what you 
need to know, not what you want to hear” based on the threat posed by the insurgency 
and the resultant second-order effects to international government policy. Bunker 
maintains VMTCOs are no longer traditional transnational criminal organizations, but 
morphing into “warmaking organizations” indicative of an insurgency and subsequent 
national security threat.174 His testimony offers subcommittee members a brutally honest 
yet graphic account of daily beheadings, gruesome (perhaps spiritually motivated) 
murders, and torture. His main premise is that situation “is going well beyond the 
endemic quick and dirty assassinations or engagements between rival cartel/gang forces 
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or between cartel commandos and Mexican police or military forces”175 discussed in 
other testimony within this review. Bunker’s line of reasoning is supported by other 
scholars in Narcos Over the Border: Gangs, Cartels and Mercenaries, a compilation of 
essays by 10 noted academic, law enforcement and defense practitioners and an extension 
of Small Wars Journal. Bunker et al. infer there is no hemispheric comprehensive 
strategy to combating the insurgency and hint to the political narrative as an underlying 
force. Further, the authors leave no doubt that political forces are underestimating the 
scope of VMTCO activities and subsequent spillover violence into the United States. 
Yet again, in testimony to the contrary, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
the Western Hemisphere Frank O’Mora states, “on behalf of the Department of Defense, 
I would like to reiterate that thanks to the tireless work of the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, the U.S. Department of Justice, and other U.S. Federal, State, and 
local law enforcement and other authorities, we have no evidence of so-called ‘spillover 
violence’ into the United States.”176 In contrast, qualitative analysis by Sylvia Longmire 
in Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico’s Drug War depicts concrete examples of 
violence spilling over the border and discusses in detail kidnapping (the second most 
lucrative technique used by VMTCOs within the United States after drugs), 
assassinations and human smuggling. In terms of the political narrative, the reader infers 
VMTCO activities into the United States can only be contained (not prevented) by 
appropriate and congruent policy applications from both governments, thus suggesting an 
alarming security threat along the Southwestern border.  
Testimony over spillover violence amongst politicians, scholars, policy makers, 
and practitioners is sporadic and polarizing at best. While one camp annotates spillover 
violence as an impending national security threat, another seeks to refute the claim 
signaling an obvious and significant gap that points to both the political discourse and the 
manner in which spillover violence is measured and defined. 
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C. THREATS 
This violence in Mexico and the destabilizing effect it has on governance 
in the region and the threat of significant sustained spillover of violence 
into the United States elevates the subject matter from a criminal justice 
concern to the realm of a bona fide national security threat.177 
Obviously, spillover violence is dependent on a current threat at or within the 
Southwest border. The literature continually addresses aspects of Mexico becoming a 
failed state due to a perception of lawlessness from widespread VMTCO violence. The 
2008 Joint Operations Environment Report issued by the U.S. Joint Forces Command 
states, “the growing assault by the drug cartels and their thugs on the Mexican 
government over the past several years reminds one that an unstable Mexico could 
represent a homeland security problem of immense proportions to the United States.”178 
The report states the two biggest concerns to the United States, in terms of failed states, 
are Mexico and Pakistan.179 Coupled with statistics from the same year, noted scholar 
Vanda Felbab-Brown states in “The Violent Drug Market in Mexico and Lessons 
Learned from Colombia” that the death rate in Mexico due to drug violence far exceeds 
the total number of casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq.180 Given that the United States 
was actively engaged in simultaneous wars in both countries at the time under the guise 
of homeland and national security, these statistics frame the seriousness of the threat. To 
the point, literature such as a myriad of articles within Small Wars Journal point to an 
“insurgent movement” within Mexico that is crossing into the United States181 with 
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indicative force and violence182 and posing a significant threat to U.S. homeland and 
national security.183 
The notion of Mexico becoming a failed state originates from hyper-violence and 
widespread public corruption, and Mexico’s inability to control either. While much of the 
literature agrees on the extent of hyper-violence and corruption, the Mexican government 
and many scholars vehemently disagree that it is leading to a failed state. Noted scholar 
George Grayson, while in agreement with facts offered by literature, such as the 2008 
Joint Operational Environment Report and Small Wars Journal, concludes that there are 
far “too many factors—the Mexican armed forces, the Roman Catholic Church, the 
middle class, the Monterrey business community, the banking system, labor and 
professional organizations, the U.S. government, and international financial institutions, 
etc.” for Mexico to become a failed state in the traditional context.184  
U.S. Marshall David Campbell’s thesis “Evaluating the Impact of Drug 
Trafficking Organizations on the Stability of the Mexican State” supports Grayson’s 
analysis. He also discusses the rapid rise in violence within Mexico and along the 
Southwestern border and into the United States from the perspective of Mexico as a 
failed state, as well as the use of corruption, extortion, and fear-based intimidation upon 
the community.185 Campbell claims Mexico will not become a failed state, but does infer 
it will return to a centralized model of government similar to the 20th century PRI model 
that maintained a relationship with one or more VMTCOs, but did not tolerate violence. 
The debate over the status of Mexico as a failed state is somewhat irrelevant in the acute 
phase in terms of spillover violence. While it appears the general consensus within the 
literature is that Mexico is not a failed state, spillover violence can—and does—occur, 
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“threaten(ing) public safety in certain U.S. localities, including substantial increases in 
murder rates, kidnapping, and other violent crime.”186  
Discussions of a failed state and claims that Mexico is or may become a homeland 
and national security threat to the United States greatly affects current and future political 
dialogue between the two countries. This was evident in recent public discourse between 
the two as President Obama commented that the VMTCO problem in Mexico produces a 
“spillover effect” that affects tourism and the border.187 A visibly upset President 
Calderon retorted the United States was the source for rising violence in Mexico because 
of its rising demand for illegal drugs, failed immigration policy, and lax gun control 
laws.188 The tension exhibited publically between the two nation leaders is centered on 
spillover violence and the ability to control the situation, which appears inconsistent with 
and contradictory to U.S. government policies and strategies. 
The threat of spillover violence in itself is a political issue. There is currently no 
agreeable qualitative or quantitative methodology to define or track spillover violence. 
Therefore, the threat of spillover violence is left to the political discourse and used as an 
agenda. In January 2009, outgoing DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff informed incoming 
DHS Secretary Napolitano that control of the Southwestern border and Mexico’s 
transnational organized criminal organizations were “at the very top of the list of national 
security concerns” and that contingency plans were in place to guard against significant 
spillover violence.189 The issue of spillover violence was not foreign to Secretary 
Napolitano. As the Governor of Arizona in 2005, Napolitano was a vocal critic of the 
international incumbent border security strategy and, citing violence, declared a state of 
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emergency for four border counties.190 Fast-forward through six years of hyper-violence 
in Mexico and along the Southwestern border to the current political narrative offered by 
DHS Secretary Napolitano: 
It is simply inaccurate to state, and too many have, that the border with 
Mexico is overrun or out of control. This statement I think sometimes is 
made to score political points. You know, it’s wrong. It’s just plain wrong. 
Continuing to make these assertions in the face of everything that is 
happening and everything that has been done not only has negative 
consequences for our own border communities but it also disrespects the 
efforts of the law enforcement men and women on that border.191 
There is lack of a clear and congruent strategy to combat the VMTCO threat.192 
The situation is termed an insurgency by noted scholars, such as Bunker, Grayson, and 
Killebrew, and policy makers including Secretary of State Hilary Clinton.193 Yet, the 
political narrative continues to challenge such characterizations. Shortly after Secretary 
Clinton’s announcement that the drug violence in Mexico was reminiscent of an 
insurgency, President Obama was forced to publically apologize to irate Mexican 
officials, withdraw any insurgency construct, and state, “Mexico is an ample democracy, 
with a growing economy.”194 The inability of the political discourse to openly address 
the issue leads to a failed strategy to combat the threat. Dr. Robert Killebrew, a fellow at 
the Center for New American Security, concurs and states the United States is slow to 
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recognize the strategic threat posed to the United States by violence in Mexico195 or the 
potential threat to national security.196  
D. THE FUTURE 
The 21st century ushered in new transnational cooperation to combat VMTCO 
activities with unprecedented programs like the Merida Initiative. Unfortunately, despite 
such programs, the literature suggests VMTCOs remain a distinct threat as violence has 
achieved record levels and shows few signs of reversing present course. Spillover 
violence lies at the heart of the issue with no accepted definition and, therefore, no 
manner of quantifying or qualifying the threat. Also evident within the literature, openly 
claiming spillover violence admits fault toward Mexico’s security apparatus and U.S. 
border security control efforts, and the political narrative will currently support neither 
based on historical constructs. While the literature opines on solutions to ameliorate the 
U.S. war on drugs with grandiose policy change, financial commitment to Mexico and 
drug demand reduction programs, it fails to correlate rising VMTCO activity and 
violence in Mexico with an increasing presence and threat in U.S. cities. The literature 
infers a gap in the understanding, definition and context of spillover violence and a 
subsequent misleading characterization of the threat by either side at and within the 
Southwest border. 
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III. RESEARCH-BASED DECISION MAKING 
A critical analysis of the literature suggests there is no congruent methodology 
used to frame spillover violence. Egregious examples of spillover (such as murder of law 
enforcement agents) are often at the forefront in the political discourse, but are quickly 
dismissed as anecdotal and isolated by the other side of the political aisle. The analysis of 
relevant literature reveals how nationally utilized criminal indexes are used to qualify and 
quantify violent crimes in cities along the border and, more importantly, how they are 
predominately used to claim there is no spillover violence. The methodology used within 
this thesis evaluates the different definitions of spillover violence in relation to how the 
UCR program is used to classify violent crimes in the United States, and the TXDPS 
initiative to combat and classify border crime through Operation Border Star. 
A. SPILLOVER VIOLENCE 
There is no universally accepted definition of spillover violence. DHS, which 
houses Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Patrol, does not 
have an official definition. Lack of a congruent and universal definition makes it difficult 
for policy makers and practitioners to combat the threat of violence across the border.197 
The current interagency definition at the federal level, based on the UCR 
Program,198 is offered by the Drug Enforcement Administration: 
Spillover violence entails deliberate, planned attacks by the cartels on U.S. 
assets, including civilian, military, or law enforcement officials, innocent 
U.S. citizens, or physical institutions such as government buildings, 
consulates, or businesses. This definition does not include trafficker on 
trafficker violence, whether perpetrated in Mexico or the U.S.199 
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TXDPS expands upon this definition to include “trafficker-on-trafficker” 
violence, as well as “aggravated assault, extortion, kidnapping, torture, rape and 
murder.”200 Zapata, Texas County Sheriff Sigifredo Gonzalez, Jr., former chairman of 
the Texas Border Sheriff’s Coalition, testified before Congress and offered a “glimpse of 
daily life” through the lens of a border town and insists the following must be included in 
any definition of spillover violence: kidnapping, carjacking, home invasion, extortion, 
gunfire from across the border, armed individuals escorting drug and human loads across 
the border, VMTCO members personally visiting U.S. law enforcement officer homes 
and threatening their families, U.S. gang affiliation with VMTCOs, illegal immigrants 
with murder and child molestation convictions, and auto theft (vehicles are used for 
smuggling of humans and drugs).201 
1. Southwest Border Task Force  
Of course, we do observe and experience effects of local criminal 
activities with a nexus to [cartels] on our side of the border, such as drug-
related gang shootings, robberies, and kidnappings. We also observe a 
certain amount of violent crime related to illicit activities at the border; 
such as violence associated with human trafficking, or the multiple 
assaults that occur against agents and officers on a daily basis. Not only 
has this type of violence long been a reality on the U.S.-Mexico border, 
but curtailing it requires a different approach in terms of scale and tactics 
than protecting against so-called spillover violence, should it in fact 
occur.202 
In 2009, the Southwest Border Task Force convened with the Homeland Security 
Advisory Council to discuss Southwest border recommendations and offer a discussion 
on the need of a definition for spillover violence. The task force argued that a clear 
definition was needed to allow DHS the ability to converse in a more coordinated manner 
on border violence issues, as well as match threats with applicable policy and 
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enforcement actions.203 The task force acknowledged how the political and public 
discourses “have seized upon the concept of spillover violence”204 and recommended 
five distinct definitions to distinguish between the many anomalies of border violence: 
criminal violence, border-related organized crime violence, violence against law 
enforcement agents, border violence, and spillover violence (see Appendix A).205 
Criminal violence includes use or threat of force within the United States, and 
includes kidnapping and extortion.206 Border-related organized violence is defined by the 
task force as violent crimes that take place away from the border but have links to cross-
border activities, such as drugs, cash, weapons and human smuggling, and trafficking.207 
Violence against law enforcement officers includes all acts of violence with a nexus to 
cross-border crimes with the exception of violence associated directly with VMTCOs.208 
Border violence is any act of violence that takes place within 25 miles of the U.S. side of 
the border, spans the U.S.-Mexico border or U.S.-Mexican territory, has links to cross-
border violence, and adds illegal immigration.209 Finally, spillover violence starts in 
Mexico and carries over into the United States. It includes VMTCO conflicts with other 
VMTCOs or Mexican government forces and, according to the task force, has never 
occurred.210 
The current framework surrounding spillover violence definitions relies on crimes 
reported by local, state and federal officials within the UCR program as an initial 
benchmark to gauge spillover violence. Texas, on the other hand, claims the UCR 
program is not sufficient. Hence, an understanding of the UCR program is warranted if it 
is to become a foundational pillar to any accepted framework of spillover violence. 
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B. FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (UCR) PROGRAM 
The UCR program is a voluntary law enforcement program managed by the FBI 
with the sole purpose of collecting and providing reliable nationwide criminal statistics 
on certain crimes known to law enforcement agencies.211 The UCR program provides 
“data on known offenses and persons arrested by law enforcement agencies” and does not 
reflect official verdicts ruled within the judicial system.212 The UCR program collects an 
extensive nationwide amount of crime data for annual reports including Crime in the 
United States, Hate Crime Statistics and Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted. 
Information from the UCR program is publically accessible by law enforcement agencies, 
politicians, the general public, municipalities, media organizations, academic and 
research institutions, etc., and is used to chronicle criminal trends in a given region.213  
The original intent of the UCR program is to collect crime statistics based on the 
seriousness of the offense, frequency of occurrence (from a national perspective) and 
likelihood of being reported to local law enforcement agencies. The UCR program has 
two methods for collecting crime data: the Summary System or the National Incident 
Based Reporting System (NIBRS). Currently, the Summary System is the de facto 
method for reporting crime into the UCR program. The majority of agencies incorrectly 
refer to the Summary System as the UCR program most likely because it is the main 
method of collecting statistics. NIBRS is rather new and not as universally accepted. For 
the purposes of this thesis, the Summary System and NIBRS are separated and discussed 
as part of the greater UCR program in order to give the reader a better understanding of 
how crime is collected and what it means for establishing a framework on spillover 
violence within the political discourse. 
                                                 





1. The Summary System  
The UCR program was conceived by the International Chiefs of Police in 1929 
and, through Congressional mandate, managed by the FBI since 1930. At its inception, 
400 law enforcement agencies representing 43 states and 20 million citizens voluntarily 
submitted criminal statistics.214 To date, 17,456 law enforcement agencies in 46 states215 
representing over 300 million citizens (97.4% of the total population) submit data into the 
UCR program through the Summary System.216 It is neither practical for the Summary 
System to distinguish between the many different local and state statutes represented nor 
categorize crime by designations, such as misdemeanor or felony due to the many 
different state codes.217 Therefore, the Summary System program employs national 
standard definitions and encourages participating organizations to view crimes within this 
context to the best of their ability.  
The Summary System requires law enforcement agencies to translate or classify 
local or state offenses into categories offered by the FBI. The Summary System then 
requires these agencies to report the total number of crimes (termed scoring) once they 
are divided into categories. The Summary System divides offenses into Part I and Part II 
crimes. The more serious Part I crimes include eight offenses divided into violent crimes 
and property crimes (Table 1)218 while Part II crimes include 21 additional offenses 
(Table 2).219  
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UCR Summary Reporting System Part I Crimes 
VIOLENT CRIMES PROPERTY CRIMES 
Murder and non-negligent manslaughter Burglary 
Forcible rape Larceny-theft 
Burglary Motor vehicle theft 
Aggravated assault Arson (added 1979) 
Table 1.   UCR Summary System Part I Crimes in Hierarchal Descending Order 





Fraud Embezzlement Stolen Property 
Vandalism Weapons Prostitution & 
Commercialized 
Vice 
Sex Offenses Drug Abuse 
Violations 




Driving Under the 
Influence 
Liquor Laws Drunkenness 
Disorderly 
Conduct 
Vagrancy All Other 
Offenses 
Suspicion Curfew and 
Loitering Laws 
(under 18) 
 Runaways (under 
18) 
 
Table 2.   UCR Summary System Part II Crimes 
The Summary System submits an addendum to the FBI for murder and non-
negligent manslaughter on a monthly basis in the UCR Supplemental Homicide Report. 
The addendum gathers age, sex and race for victims and offenders, the relationship 
between the two, the type of weapon used, and the circumstances surrounding the 
event.220 No other crime captures this information within the Summary System. 
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Law enforcement agencies submit aggregate data into the Summary System each 
month through consistent and certified state programs or directly to the FBI.221 The 
program is voluntary and not all law enforcement agencies participate or provide data for 
the entire year. The information is collected in three categories divided into Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs),222 cities outside MSAs, and nonmetropolitan counties.223 For 
agencies that do not report or only report for a portion of each year, the FBI determines 
crime levels based on whether an agency participated in the Summary System from zero 
to three months, three to 11 months or less than 12 months. A “standard estimation 
procedure,” or statistical imputation, is used to compile crime statistics for the rest of the 
year for those agencies participating between three and 12 months. If the agency 
participates less than three months, the FBI uses crime statistics from similarly sized 
areas within the state.224 
Due to the size, scope and voluntary nature of the UCR program in general, 
information entered into the Summary System depends on the integrity and accuracy of 
the law enforcement agency, as well as the UCR program’s ability to provide quality 
control.225 On the front end, the UCR program provides proactive onsite training to 
educate participating law enforcement agencies on common standards, reporting 
guidelines and policies, and provides the UCR Handbook to agencies for reference.226 On 
the back end, it has an array of algorithmic methodologies to crosscheck information in 
attempt to ensure the data is honest and accurate.227 
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Data within the Summary System is used in many ways that range from policy 
decisions to monetary and grant allocation.228 Law enforcement agencies use the data for 
administrative, operational or budgetary reasons; policy makers make legislative 
recommendations; scholars analyze criminal trends; and, the general public and media 
outlets may attempt to analyze the crime problem in a given area.229 Data, therefore, can 
also be construed by various organizations to understand the current criminal trends in a 
given region. For this reason, the FBI goes to great lengths to caution against using data 
within the Summary System to rank areas or comment on the effectiveness of law 
enforcement. The FBI neither ranks nor analyses data within the UCR program (as a 
whole) because of the many societal ramifications involved in different geographic 
regions including, but not limited to, urbanization, economy of the region, citizen 
reporting mechanisms, and effectiveness of both representative law enforcement agencies 
and local judicial system capabilities.230 In fact, the FBI alphabetically lists the Summary 
System data and leaves any analysis, positive or negative, to the end user. 
There are three general rules that govern how the Summary System governs 
criminal activity. The Summary System employs the hierarchy, hotel and separation of 
time and space rules.231 The hierarchy rule only permits the more significant crime to be 
reported if more than one crime occurs in a given incident.232 For example, if a person is 
raped and then murdered, only the murder is entered into the Summary System because it 
is the more serious offense. This includes both Part I and Part II crimes. There are three 
exceptions to the hierarchy rule: arson, motor vehicle theft and justifiable homicide.233 
Arson is always reported, even if committed in concert with another crime. Only motor-
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vehicle theft is reported, even if committed with another Part II (higher) crime. In 
addition, justifiable homicide is reported (as non-negligent homicide), as well as the 
offense of the other party.234 
Similarly, a hotel rule applies to any multiple-dwellings (hotels, motels, hostels, 
etc.) under the supervision of a manager. If a series of crimes occur within these types of 
occupancies, only one crime is reported by the manager rather than one for each 
individual.235 The hotel rule does not apply to individually owned or rented units, such as 
condominiums, apartments or storage units. 
The separation of time and space rule applies to multiple crimes committed in 
different locations within a relatively short time frame. In this case, each crime is 
reported separately.236 For example, several home burglaries committed on a residential 
street during the night would each warrant separate reports. However, only one crime is 
reported should law enforcement suspect targeted burglaries on the same street occurring 
over an extended period of time are being committed by the same individual. 
Arrests are similar to offenses and must also be translated and tallied into the 
Summary System. The hierarchy, hotel and separation of time and space rule also affect 
arrest data, and the law enforcement agency can only use one crime classification for 
reporting.237 For example, an individual arrested for multiple offenses (murder, simple 
assault, and unlawful weapon) will only register as one arrest. Therefore, arrest data only 
shows the total number of arrests as opposed to the total number of offenses. 
2. The National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) 
During the 1970s, consensus within the law enforcement community called for 
expanding the methods used for the Summary System to meet the needs of 21st century 
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law enforcement.238 In 1985, an FBI and Bureau of Justice Statistics study released the 
Blueprint for the Future of the Uniform Crime Reporting Program and recommended law 
enforcement agencies use an incident-based system to report data.239 The FBI conducted 
a pilot program with the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division and released the 
results at the UCR national conference in 1988 to overwhelming support. Subsequently, 
attendees unanimously endorsed implementation of NIBRS. Law enforcement agencies 
may now report data into the UCR program through either the Summary System or 
NIBRS.  
As of May 2011, there are 32 states240 certified by NIBRS representing 27% of 
reported crime from 43% of law enforcement agencies covering 28% of the 
population.241 In Texas, 53 agencies represent 13.6% of the state population reporting 
data into NIBRS through the TXDPS.242 
NIBRS data is intended to augment local law enforcement incident-based 
reporting systems allowing local agencies to develop needs-specific data within a 
respective jurisdiction.243 The original intent was to take advantage of available crime 
data secured in law enforcement record management systems, provide considerably more 
detail, and yield more elaborate and functional data than the Summary System.244 
Submitted data must meet NIBRS standardized guidelines outlined within Uniform Crime 
Reporting National Incident-Based Reporting System, Volume 1: Data Collection 
Guidelines, and Volume 2: Data Submission Specifications. In an effort to sustain quality 
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control, submitting crime data to the FBI is preferably done through a certified state 
program. The state must prove it has the capability of processing NIBRS data fields with 
an error rate below 4%, statistical reasonableness based on trends, crime volume and 
fluctuation, a capability to update and respond to the national program, and system 
interoperability.245 If there is no certified state program, the FBI may allow a local 
agency to submit directly so long as it serves a population over 100,000 and utilizes a 
NIBRS compliant incident-based reporting system.246 
Similar to the Summary System, NIBRS must also translate (classify) and tally 
(score) offenses. NIBRS includes more detail than the Summary System and classifies 
offenses into Group A or Group B offenses (rather than Part I or Part II). Group A 
offenses include 22 categories (compared to eight) separated into violent crimes, property 
crimes and crimes against society247 in which law enforcement agencies must collect and 
report extensive data (Table 3).248 Group B offenses include 11 additional categories in 
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Assault Offenses Bribery Drug/narcotic Offenses 
Homicide Offenses Arson Gambling Offenses 
Kidnapping/Abduction Burglary/Breaking and Entering Prostitution Offenses 
Robbery Counterfeiting/Forgery Pornography/Obscene 
Material 






Motor Vehicle Theft 
Stolen Property Offenses 





Table 3.   UCR National Incident Based Reporting System Group A Offenses 
UCR National Incident Based Incident Reporting Group B Offenses 




Driving Under the 
Influence 
Drunkenness Family Offenses (non-violent) Liquor Law 
Violations 
Peeping Tom 
Runaway Trespass of Real Property All Other 
Offenses 
 
Table 4.   UCR National Incident Based Reporting System Group B Offenses. 
According to the FBI, NIBRS “produces more detailed, accurate, and meaningful 
data than the Summary Reporting System” and furnishes information on nearly all 
aspects of crime including terrorism and organized crime.250 Additionally, it collects data 
that is unavailable in the Summary System, such as weapons and force used on all violent 
offenses, circumstances of murders and assaults and injuries received, and both 
residencies and relationships between assailants and victims.251 
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NIBRS makes changes to the hierarchy, hotel and separation of time and place 
rules that govern the Summary System. There is no hierarchy rule associated with NIBRS 
and all crimes committed by a single individual are reported. For example, if an intruder 
rapes the wife, but murders the husband, NIBRS reports both offenses whereas the 
Summary System only reports the more significant murder offense. The definition of the 
hotel rule is expanded to include rental storage facilities and the provisions of the 
separation of time and space rule remain the same.  
NIBRS must also tally (score) offenses. NIBRS permits increased data collection 
to include multiple crimes, victims, arrests and offenders for a single incident due to 
changes in the hierarchy, hotel and separation of time and place rules.252 The data is more 
comprehensive and gives those who access the information a “full accounting of the 
status of public safety.”253  
NIBRS implements many changes to the Summary System and is designed to 
increase the accuracy of crime reporting and its subsequent trends. However, adoption of 
NIBRS is slow making it a minority when compared to the Summary System.  
3. Use of the UCR Program 
The intent of the UCR program is to provide reliable crime statistics for the 
nation. However, that does not necessarily represent the true nature of crime. For the past 
several decades, over 90% of law enforcement agencies have submitted data to the UCR 
program making it an indicator of criminal statistics within the confines of the Summary 
System or NIBRS methodologies.254 Both collect crime with different methods and 
results may reflect disparities between the nature of offenses.  
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The UCR program does not necessarily account for the total number of crimes 
committed. The system is voluntary and UCR uses imputations that may overestimate or 
underestimate the true nature of criminal statistics in a given region for those agencies 
that do not submit data for part of the year.255 
DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano visited the Texas-Mexico border in February 
2012 with U.S. Customs and Border Protection Commissioner David Aguilar to meet 
state and local officials, assess customs and border protection operations along the 
Southwestern border, and discuss administration successes and DHS initiatives to 
providing a secure but open border with Mexico.256 During a press conference at the 
McAllen, Texas Border Patrol Station, Secretary Napolitano stated, “violent crime in 
these areas [Austin, Brownsville, Dallas, El Paso, Houston, Laredo, McAllen and San 
Antonio] has gone down significantly. These are among the safest areas in the United 
States.”257 
Plotting Summary System violent crime data from major Texas MSAs and border 
towns with known VMTCO activity over a five-year period appears to visually support 
Secretary Napolitano’s claim and reveal a relatively stagnant or declining trend when 
compared to the hyper-violence in Mexico over the same time period (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2.   UCR Violent Crimes for Texas Border Cities and Major Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas 
However, individual examination of Summary System data shows that violent 
crimes are going down for all these municipalities with the exception of El Paso and San 
Antonio. When El Paso and San Antonio MSAs are plotted independently using the same 
the Summary System data, violent crimes are actually rising for in El Paso (Figure 3) and 





Figure 3.   UCR Violent Crimes for El Paso, Texas 
 
Figure 4.   UCR Violent Crimes for San Antonio, Texas 
UCR data offers a limited look and is not necessarily indicative of violent crimes 
along the border depending on whether the Summary System or NIBRS is used. In 2006, 
Texas launched a series of border operations to combat emerging threats along its border. 
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The results of Texas border operations offer a general comprehension of VMTCO 
activities along and within the border, as well as a different lens from which to view UCR 
data. 
C. OPERATION BORDER STAR 
The spillover violence in Texas is real and it is escalating.258 
– Texas Senators John Cornyn and Kay Bailey Hutchison in a letter to 
President Barack Obama 
Operation Border Star is the current border security operation for the state of 
Texas. The mission is to combat violent cross-border crimes and illicit activities along the 
Texas-Mexico border through patrol, surveillance and direct action.259 Operation Border 
Star is a multi-agency operation encompassing 53 border counties, 65 local and county 
police departments, Texas Parks & Wildlife, TXDPS, Texas Military Forces, and DHS 
agencies (see Appendix B).260 
Texas instituted a series of border security operations as a method of combating 
and chronicling border violence. In February 2006, Texas “instituted a plan to increase 
security on the Texas-Mexico border which included: increased local and state patrols; 
centralized coordination of patrol operations; centralized intelligence to drive operations; 
and leveraging technology to enhance radio interoperability, information sharing and 
fingerprint identification.”261 Texas border security operations have progressed through 
Operations Linebacker, Rio Grande, Wrangler and Border Star, and involve multi-agency 
partnerships from that range from local law enforcement to the U.S. Customs and Border 
patrol and the National Guard. These programs are credited with demonstrating how 
multi-agency integration is both operationally efficient and cost-effective at targeting and 
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reducing border violence.262 Local and state resources, such as the Texas Border 
Sheriff’s Coalition, organized as an effort to unite law enforcement agencies and increase 
public and national security along the border (Figure 5), continue to help fill resource 
gaps in agencies like the U.S. Border Patrol.263 To date, Texas has contributed over $200 
million in federal and state grant funding to these border operations.264 
 
 
Figure 5.   Texas Border Sheriff’s Coalition265 
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1. Border Security Operations Center (BSOC) 
The Border Security Operations Center (BSOC) is the focal point of Operation 
Border Star and located in Austin, Texas within the Texas Fusion Center. It is operated 
by the Texas Rangers division of TXDPS and includes civilian analysts, as well as 
members of Customs and Border Patrol and Texas Military Forces. BSOC serves as the 
nerve center for six Joint Operation Intelligence Centers (JOIC) along the Texas-Mexico 
border and is responsible for collecting, analyzing and disseminating border-related 
security information for the intelligence-driven Operation Border Star.  
BSOC operates two important technology initiatives. First, TXMAP is a mapping 
software program that enables BSOC to import, view and disseminate information 
specific to violent incidents, drug, weapon and cash seizures, transnational gang 
affiliations, law enforcement pursuits, and real-time resource allocation.266 Data within 
TXMAP is viewable at BSOC, JOICs, and by TXDPS personnel and various federal 
agencies. TXMAP offers incident support, as well as trends throughout the state and 
border region. 
Second, BSOC monitors Operation Drawbridge that consists of a series of 500 
remote cameras strategically placed along the border.267 The cameras are small wildlife 
cameras with motion detection and low-light capability, modified to meet border security 
needs (Figure 6). They are monitored at all times without interruption by BSOC, the 
Texas Fusion Center, JOICs, and a host of federal agencies including the Customs and 
Border Patrol. 
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Figure 6.   Border Security Operation Center Operation Drawbridge268  
Operation Drawbridge increases the efficiency of border operations simply 
because the cameras cover more area in real time given the length and remoteness of the 
Texas-Mexico border, as well as the dynamic nature of VMTCO activities.269 BSOC and 
other agencies are able to direct tactical interdiction or search and rescue efforts270 based 
on detection capabilities of Operation Drawbridge. As of January 2012, the strategic 
success and sustained impact of Operation Drawbridge against VMTCO driven border 
violence and crime is credited with detecting 4,000 criminal activities, 2,000 
apprehensions and over five tons of illegal contraband.271 
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The BSOC also serves as the operations center for Texas Ranger Reconnaissance 
Team missions. Ranger Reconnaissance Teams are highly trained tactical teams tasked 
with border region missions specific to combating VMTCOs.272 These teams offer both 
overt and covert capabilities273 and are often inserted in remote border areas difficult for 
routine security operations. Details of Ranger Reconnaissance missions remain classified. 
2. Joint Operation Intelligence Centers (JOIC) and Unified Command 
There are six Joint Operation Intelligence Centers (JOIC) along the Texas-Mexico 
border located (and named accordingly) in El Paso, Big Bend, Laredo, Rio Grande 
Valley, and Coastal Bend (Figure 7). All six JOICs are staffed with personnel from local 
to federal agencies and liaise with each other, the Texas Fusion Center and BSOC. 
 
                                                 





Figure 7.   Texas Border Security Operation Center (BSOC) and Joint Intelligence 
Operations Centers (JOIC)274 
There are multiple local, municipal, county, state and federal resources 
combatting border violence and crimes along the 1,254-mile Texas border. Therefore, 
JOICs were established under the unified command concept established within the 
National Response Framework,275 meaning they “facilitate coordination and cooperation 
among member law enforcement agencies to achieve commonly-held objectives, 
eliminate duplication of effort, and achieve greater results than uncoordinated operations 
would produce.”276  
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Local law enforcement agencies are responsible for combating VMTCO-related 
border violence and crime in their respective jurisdiction. Under the unified command 
concept, JOICs ensure that “each agency functions within its jurisdictional lines of 
authority in accordance with its own chain of command,”277 as well as implement 
common intelligence-driven strategies to ensure collaborative mechanisms are in place to 
combat VMTCO-related border violence and crime. The unified command concept 
utilized by JOICs allows intelligence and information sharing, joint operational planning, 
and area inter-agency resource allocation.278  
The unified command concept ensures cooperation, collaboration, intelligence 
sharing, and real-time incident support among all agencies. Aviation resources are a large 
part of border security operations due to the length of the border and include surveillance 
drones utilized for BSOC and operated by the Customs and Border Protection Air and 
Marine Division, assets from Texas Military Forces, U.S. Coast Guard, and TXDPS. The 
Texas-Mexico border is also separated by the Rio Grande River and has maritime 
vulnerabilities along the Gulf of Mexico. Both the Rio Grande River and the Gulf of 
Mexico are utilized by VMTCOs for aggressive and violent operations. Therefore, 
maritime resources are an important part of the unified command concept. In addition to 
U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection Air and Marine Division resources, 
Texas recently placed four “shallow water interceptors” (high-powered gunboats) into 
operation. Each interceptor is 34-feet long, capable of operating in 18-inches of water 
with 900 horsepower, and has six mounted automatic weapons behind armor plating 
(Figure 8). The interceptors are part of a $3.3 million combined DHS grant and Texas 
Legislature allocated funding package and represent a “significant enhancement of the 
department’s ability to detect, disrupt and deter illegal activity along the Rio Grande 
River and Texas coast.”279  
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Figure 8.   Texas Department of Public Safety Shallow Water Interceptor280 
3. Texas Crime Reporting and Operation Border Star 
Texas is in the process of implementing its own version of NIBRS called the 
Texas Incident Based Reporting System. NIBRS data is intended to augment local law 
enforcement incident-based reporting systems allowing local agencies to develop needs-
specific data within a respective jurisdiction such as the border region.281 The Texas 
Incident Based Reporting System is a long way from full implementation,282 but is 
currently collecting incident-based reports from 53 law enforcement agencies that  
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represent 13.6% of the state population.283 However, Texas reports state crime through 
the Summary System and must statistically calibrate any NIBRS data into the Summary 
System format for inclusion into the UCR program.284  
Texas is fully aware that the current Summary System is insufficient for capturing 
multiple levels of crime. The literature review revealed that TXDPS Director Steve 
McCraw testified before Congress about the inequities of the Summary System format 
specific to spillover violence and VMTCO-related crime.285  
Therefore, Texas uses the framework of Operation Border Star to qualify crimes 
specific to border violence and VMTCO activities. Details are collected on incidents with 
a VMTCO nexus through intelligence gathered within the JOIC area of responsibility, 
confidential informants, and detailed analysis. This information is used to capture a 
realistic threat picture and increase efficiency in future enforcement and intelligence 
operations. While this information is not currently of use within the UCR program, it will 
be incorporated into the Texas Incident Based Reporting System. 
4. Operation Border Star Data 
Operation Border Star documents violent crimes related to VMTCO activity 
based upon intelligence gathered within the JOICs and BSOC, investigations by Texas 
Rangers and TXDPS Criminal Investigations Division, and confidential informants. 
Since its inception, arrests total 89 from the Gulf VMTCO, nine from the Vicente Carrillo 
Fuentes (Juarez) VMTCO, 165 from the La Familia Michoacána VMTCO, 72 from the 
Los Zetas VMTCO, and two from the Sinaloa VMTCO.286 This list does not reflect gang 
members affiliated with VMTCOs. Since 2010, there were 25 homicides throughout the 
state with the large majority occurring in border communities, 22 assaults, 15 shootings, 
                                                 
283 Lesko, Uniform Crime Reports Program, 3. 
284 Texas Department of Public Safety, “The Texas Uniform Crime Reporting Program.” 
285 U.S. House, Committee on Homeland Security, On the Border and in the Line of Fire: U.S. Law 
Enforcement, Homeland Security and Drug Cartel Violence. 
286 Texas Department of Public Safety, “Mexican Cartel Related Activity.” 
 72
and 18 kidnappings.287 Operation Border star has confiscated 2,631 weapons (Figure 9), 
and since 2009, documented 73 assaults on law enforcement officers resulting in 58 shots 
fired. This does not include 2,540 high-speed pursuits with 77 caltrop288 deployments 
(Figure 10) and 65 splashdowns289 into the Rio Grande River.290  
 
 
Figure 9.   Operation Border Star Weapons Seizures 
                                                 
287 Texas Department of Public Safety, “Mexican Cartel Related Activity.” 
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Figure 10.   Caltrop—Man-Made Tire Deflation Device Deployed by VMTCOs 
Against Law Enforcement Agencies During High Speed Pursuits291 
Operation Border Star has eight documented cases of government corruption that 
includes U.S. law enforcement officers, Chiefs of Police, and Justices of the Peace.292 
This does not include 127 cases of confirmed Customs and Border Protection corruption 
or an investigation into 267 additional accounts within DHS.293 VMTCO corruption of 
government officials is one of Mexico’s toughest battles and has required reorganization 
of the Federal Police, as well as mobilization of Mexican military forces.  
VMTCOs are using violence for several reasons, but one of the main reasons is to 
protect drug shipments. Drugs remain the staple of the VMTCO business plan. VMTCOs 
control the drug smuggling routes across the Southwestern border ports of entry and now 
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have the ability to produce, transport and distribute almost all illicit drugs.294 Violence 
will accompany transnational drug shipments. Seizures for Texas border operations are 
measured along the border region and major corridors out of El Paso, Laredo and the Rio 
Grande Valley. Marijuana, cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine are the major drugs 
smuggled into Texas by VMTCOs (Table 5). 
 
Major Corridor and Border Region Drug Seizure April 2006 – June 
2012 
DRUG TOTAL STREET VALUE PRICE/POUND 
Marijuana 7,996,473 $4,407,176,129.22 $551.14 
Cocaine 78,162 $2,311,222,819.20 $29,446.08 
Heroin 1,986 $81,075,093.66 $40,823.31 
Methamphetamine 6,740 $256,614,613.12 $37,988.36 
TOTAL 8,083,941 $7,065,088,655.20  
Table 5.   Major Drug Seizures for Texas Border Operations 2006–2012295 
VMTCOs are major suppliers of marijuana into the United States. Since 2005, 
production capability has grown over 300% in Mexico, but VMTCOs, such as La Familia 
Michoacána, have domestic growing capability within the United States as well.296 
Operation Border Star has seized a disproportionate amount of marijuana compared to 
other drugs and seizures continue to rise (Figure 11).  
 
                                                 
294 U.S. Department of Justice, “National Drug Threat Assessment 2011,” 7. 
295 Texas Department of Public Safety, “Drugs,” (n.d.), 
http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/PublicInformation/cartelCrimeStats.htm. 
296 STRATFOR, Criminal Commodities: Marijuana (Austin, TX, 2012). 
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Figure 11.   Operation Border Star Marijuana Seizures 
The demise of the Cali and Medellin cartels’ Caribbean shipment routes in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s have positioned VMTCOs in a lucrative position for 
smuggling cocaine into the United States from South America.297 Peru has become the 
largest producer of cocaine298 and shipments into the United States are now traversing 
Mexico. VMTCOs continue to see a high return on investment ($23,000 profit per 
kilogram between South America and the United States)299 and Operation Border Star 
seizures remain steady (Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 12.   Operation Border Star Cocaine Seizures 
                                                 
297 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Mexican Drug Cartels, by Colleen W. 
Cook, CRS Report RL34215 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, 
October 16. 2007), 4. 
298 BBC News Latin America & Caribbean, “Colombia Cocaine Production Drops 25%, Says US 
Report,” July 31, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19059953. 
299 STRATFOR, Criminal Commodities Series: Cocaine (Austin, TX, 2012). 
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Mexico is now the second largest opium poppy producer in the world behind 
Afghanistan.300 Afghanistan controls roughly 90% of the world heroin market and 
Mexico controls 7%.301 However, VMTCOs are beginning to take shortcuts and produce 
black-tar heroin at a far cheaper cost.302 Mexican heroin production rates have grown 
over 600% since 2005 and 58% of all heroin seizures in the United States were along the 
Southwestern border in 2010.303 Heroin retains the largest return on investment for 
VMTCOs and Operation Border Star seizures are rising (Figure 13). 
 
 
Figure 13.   Operation Border Star Heroin Seizures 
VMTCOs are now the largest importer of methamphetamine product into the 
United States.304 Production is on the rise in Mexico primarily because it is not 
dependent upon environmental conditions, precursor chemicals are loosely regulated in 
Mexico, and the return on investment is high.305 Seizures of methamphetamine are 
increasing despite VMTCOs dubious methods of concealment (Figure 14). 
 
                                                 








Figure 14.   Operation Border Star Methamphetamine Seizures 
Cash is obviously used during drug, weapon, ransom and extortion activities. The 
amount of cash flowing out of Texas into Mexico as a result of VMTCO activities ranges 
from $19 to $29 billion dollars per year.306 Operation Border Star has seized well over 
$150 million dollars in cash, not including street value of narcotics, and seizures are 
rising (Figure 15). 
 
 
Figure 15.   Operation Border Star Cash Seizures 
 
 
                                                 
306 Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “2010 Bi-national Criminal Proceeds Study,” (n.d.), 
http://www.ice.gov/cornerstone/cps-study.htm. 
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The Texas Fusion Center uses TXMAP software to input this data and provide 
graphical representations for BSOC in order to monitor trends and allocate target specific 
resources. Seizures tracked from border plazas indicate flow into and throughout Texas 
along the interstate system (Figure 16). 
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TXMAP Texas Border Operations Data for Major Drug Seizures and Cash 
 
 
Marijuana Seizures Cocaine Seizures 
 
Heroin Seizures Methamphetamine Seizures 
 
TXMAP Cash Seizures 
Figure 16.   Operation Border Star Drug and Cash Seizures Through TXMAP307 
                                                 
307 Texas Department of Public Safety, “Drugs.” 
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Operation Border Star works with federal partners on illegal immigration. As of 
2011, Customs and Border Patrol lists 1,160,545 illegal immigrant apprehensions in 
Texas.308 Operation Border Star attributes 27,880 crimes to 6,508 of illegal immigrants 
who already have records within the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.309 From 
October 2008 through December 2011, Texas attributes 311,204 crimes, including 1,620 
homicides and 3,682 sexual assaults, to 98,188 “career criminal alien defendants.”310 
Operation Border Star also monitors VMTCO links to terrorist organization ties 
like Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force. In October 2011, 
the FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration foiled a plot by the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corps Quds Force to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador and attack the Israel and 
Saudi Arabian embassies with explosive devices on U.S. soil.311 One of the alleged 
attackers from Texas attempted to hire a Los Zetas VMTCO sicario (assassin) to perform 
the assassination.312 
On March 21, 2012, former Drug Enforcement Administration Chief of 
Operations Michael Braun testified before the U.S. House of Representative Committee 
on Homeland Security regarding “Iran, Hezbollah and the Threat to the Homeland.” In 
his testimony, Braun emphasized links between VMTCOs and foreign terrorist 
organizations including Al Qa’ida, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), Hezbollah, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force.313 Braun 
stated: 
 
                                                 




309 Texas Department of Public Safety, “Mexican Cartel Related Activity.” 
310 Ibid. 
311 Michael A. Braun, “Statement for the Record before the U.S. House of Representative Committee 
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If anyone thinks for a moment that Hezbollah and the Iranian Quds Force, 
the masters at leveraging and exploiting existing illicit infrastructures 
globally, are not going to focus on our Southwest border and use that as 
perhaps a springboard in attacking our country, then they just don’t 
understand how the real underworld works.314 
Congressman Michael McCaul validates these concerns in separate testimony315 
and introduces terrorist ties to human trafficking and VMTCOs. Specific to this 
discussion on human trafficking is the classification of special interest aliens, given to 
the rising influx of other than Mexican nationalities316 entering the United States through 
Mexico. In 2005, there were 1.2 million illegal aliens apprehended of which 165,000 
were other than Mexican; 650 of which were from one of 35 special interest countries 
“designated by the intelligence community as countries that could export individuals that 
could bring harm to our country in the way of terrorism.”317 DHS reported a 41% 
increase in apprehension of special interest aliens along the Texas-Mexico border from 
2002–2006 including numerous accounts of special interest aliens from countries, such as 
Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Jordan, as well as Islamic radical organizations, such as 
Hezbollah.318 DHS maintains 463,000 illegal aliens were apprehended on the Southwest 
border in 2010319 and claims this is due to fewer persons attempting to illegally cross the 
border. However, in 2010, there were 663 special interest alien apprehensions.320 Despite 
a 60% reduction in illegal alien apprehensions from 2005–2010, special interest alien 
                                                 
314 Braun, “Statement for the Record Before the U.S. House of Representative Committee On 
Homeland Security, Washington, D.C. Regarding: “Iran, Hezbollah and the Threat to the Homeland.”” 
315 U.S. House, Committee on Homeland Security, On the Border and in the Line of Fire: U.S. Law 
Enforcement, Homeland Security and Drug Cartel Violence. 
316 Other than Mexican (OTM) is an official CBP designation. 
317 House Committee on Homeland Security, A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the 
Southwest Border, 2–3. 
318 Ibid., 27. 
319 Department of Homeland Security, “Southwest Border Overview,” Department of Homeland 
Security Fact Sheet, April 5, 2011. http://www.dhs.gov/files/gc_1287434745257.shtm. 
320 U.S. Customs & Border Patrol statistics via Pullo, Judicial Watch. 
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apprehensions remained constant. There is a financial incentive for special interest alien 
human smuggling operations as they can bring upwards of $60,000 per alien.321 
D. WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN? 
There is no consistent definition of spillover violence accepted within the political 
discourse nor is there a recognized metric for capturing VMTCO violence outside of 
current FBI crime reporting methodologies. The result is a narrative that fuels a political 
agenda rather than the reality of the situation. There is no way to predict the effects of 
VMTCO violence crossing the Southwestern border without a framework that seeks to 
define and capture the true nature of events outside the political discourse, but based on 
analytics. Violence is an obvious and tangible threat of VMTCO activities moving across 
the Southwest border. The main UCR program methodology—the Summary System—
shows requisite pitfalls in capturing the totality of violent crimes directly associated with 
any definition of spillover violence while NIBRS is neither universally used nor does it 
accurately capture VMTCO violence as it is understood today. The end result as it exists 
within the political narrative obviates the real impact of the VMTCO violence taking 
place and focuses on subjective terms(s) rather than objective and accurate metrics.  
Simply labeling the issue “spillover violence” can no longer be the singular focus 
for finding realistic metrics that deal with this challenge. Finding an effective analytical 
framework for decision making related to the myriad of border issues and VMTCO 
violence may allow the United States to get beyond what has become a lightning rod 
within the political discourse that fails to account for real and dangerous consequences. 
                                                 
321 House Committee on Homeland Security, A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the 
Southwest Border, 14. 
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IV.  ESTABLISHING THE NEED FOR AN ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
The violence in Mexico by drug trafficking organizations has reached the 
level where it is now a direct threat to our national security…transnational 
organized criminal groups are becoming increasingly sophisticated and are 
engaged in a wide variety of activities, from human smuggling to 
Medicare fraud.322 
– Senator Joseph Lieberman, July 11, 2012 
A. A FRAMEWORK RATHER THAN SEMANTICS 
The origin of the term spillover violence is unknown, but it is certainly 
controversial and sensitive within the political discourse. From the U.S. perspective, it 
infers Mexico cannot control the VMTCO problem, the border is insecure, and local, 
state and federal law enforcement agencies are incapable of providing a rule of law. It 
also infers that law enforcement executives are guilty of poor performance, and 
negatively affects the tourism industry and communities’ ability to attract new businesses 
and people. From the Mexico perspective, spillover violence infers the United States 
cannot control its drug problem, hints of accusations that Mexico is becoming a failed 
state, and affects its tourism and business industry.  
Spillover violence becomes part of a social construct and implies the great wall—
or, fence in this context—is holding back hyper-violent ramifications of an out-of-control 
drug war with some violence spilling over the top. Violence does not change its meaning 
after crossing a border. The degree of violence may vary, but has more to do with law 
and judicial enforcement. A series of beheadings in Oklahoma City, Phoenix and 
Hollywood are thought by some to involve a VMTCO nexus,323 but in no way mimic the 
                                                 
322 Opening Statement of Chairman Joseph I. Lieberman on the Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee; “The Future of Homeland Security: Evolving and Emerging Threats,” Washington, 
DC, July 11, 2012. 
323 Sylvia Longmire, “Why Border Violence Spillover Needs to be Defined,” Homeland Security 
Today, January 17, 2012, http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/correspondents-watch/single-article/why-border-
violence-spillover-needs-to-be-defined/e4df3ebc4e28933d98b3c676cf2cb52f.html. 
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frequency of beheadings and mutilation experienced in Mexico. Perhaps the term 
spillover relates less to violence and more to the differences between the social 
framework of law enforcement efforts and judicial processes between the United States 
and Mexico. U.S. culture in general maintains a non-permissive environment when it 
comes to violent crime. U.S. law enforcement efforts help maintain a 93% conviction rate 
that is handled accordingly through the judicial process.324  
Mexico, however, is rampant with law enforcement corruption. The foundation of 
Calderon’s strategy against VMTCOs requires military intervention because of law 
enforcement corruption. At a recent gathering, Mexico Interior Minister Alejandro Poire 
stated that only 20% of crimes325 are reported in Mexico because of fear of VMTCO 
retribution.326 Mexico maintains only a 2% conviction rate for crimes.327 This permissive 
environment is a foreign concept on the U.S. side of the border, of which VMTCOs are 
fully aware. This lends insight into why the United States has yet to experience the 
amount, brutality and frequency of violence rampant throughout many parts of Mexico. 
Spillover violence is socially framed within the construct of permissive and non-
permissive societies. The U.S. Southwestern border is adjacent to an expanding and 
violent VMTCO dynasty and the violence used to enforce it is following the money trail 
and crossing the border. The violence is not spilling over, it is simply crossing a shared 
border and the U.S. non-permissive environment is confronting it head on. Spillover 
violence becomes a sensationalized yet erroneous term within the political discourse that 
is used to fit an agenda. This discourse is quick to capitalize on the benefits of economic 
trade, open borders and shared interests while at the same time suggesting there is an all-
                                                 
324 U.S. Department of Justice, “United States Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report, Fiscal Year 
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out war along the border. This masks the true issue and prevents a shared responsibility 
and duty to combat the spreading VMTCO threat. Perhaps more importantly, framing the 
discussion inaccurately fails to allow dealing with the challenge in a systematic and 
research-based method. 
Rather than reduce a wicked problem to a semantic term, decisions should be 
made from an analytical framework that encompasses the totality of VMTCO violence 
and activities coming across the border. VMTCOs are fulfilling a demand and using 
violence and U.S.-based gangs to insure its monetary success. The subsequent violence is 
occurring within Texas and along the Southwestern border as a result.  
Texas, however, is shying away from relying upon the term spillover violence. 
Although the concept is used openly within the political discourse, the state has quietly 
migrated toward a frame of cross-border violence. Texas is not alone in this decision and 
several federal documents favor cross-border violence, rather than spillover violence 
because it more accurately fits the problem. This changing narrative wicks controversy 
and blame, and establishes that VMTCO violence exists on both sides of the 
Southwestern border.  
The myriad of definitions for spillover violence reviewed within this thesis lack 
specificity and provide a weak framework for response and prevention of the violence. 
The emphasis is on attack and weighs more upon the object of the violence (person or 
building) rather than the type of violence used (use of a weapon, physical or sexual 
altercation) or the activity it is associated with (VMTCO, military, terrorist organization). 
The definitions neither address what the term spillover itself might mean nor the kind of 
violence that constitutes an attack. Is spillover a descriptor of the aggressor’s nationality 
or base of operation? Does spillover specifically stem from Mexico or might it come 
from another country? What if the violence is attributed to a country known to harbor a 
terrorist organization—would this be a case of spillover or terrorism? Alternatively, is 
spillover reserved for actions that stem from the Mexican drug war? If spillover is 
reserved for the Mexican drug war, does it have a geographical limit relative to the 
border? If VMTCO violence occurs in Denver, Colorado, is it still considered spillover 
violence? 
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The leading federal working definition excludes trafficker-on-trafficker violence. 
On October 25, 2011, in Juarez, Chihuahua police found the heads, arms, feet, legs, 
hands and torsos of four VMTCO members artfully displayed in front of a restaurant, 
daycare and business. The deceased were identified as members of the Vicente Fuentes 
Carrillo (Juarez) VMTCO and a note was left saying the rival New Juarez VMTCO was 
recruiting new members.328 This level of violence is a result of the drug war and common 
throughout Mexico. Comparatively, it would not be considered spillover violence had 
member(s) of the New Juarez VMTCO traveled into El Paso, Texas and committed the 
same brutal acts. This signifies an obvious gap in understanding of what is happening and 
argues that a simple definition fails to capture the significance of the threat. The 
concentration should focus on the act of violence and not the occupation of the assailant 
or victim. 
In Congressional testimony, Texas law enforcement officers state any concept of 
spillover violence must include trafficker-on-trafficker violence, extortion, kidnapping, 
torture, gang affiliation, illegal immigrants with violent convictions, and verbal threats 
against law enforcement and their families. Based on tactics discovered in intelligence-
driven border operations, Texas looks for VMTCO links in any of the following crime 
categories: drug, weapons and cash seizures, corruption, illegal alien apprehensions, 
criminal aliens, arrest of VMTCO members, VMTCO recruitment in Texas elementary 
and high schools, shootings of law enforcement officers, high speed pursuits, 
splashdowns, stolen vehicles recovered in Mexico, known or suspected VMTCO-related 
murders, and kidnappings or extortions.329 An analytical framework becomes a necessity 
as no simple definition can accurately capture what intelligence-driven analytics can state 
about the VMTCO threat.  
Texas border operations are proving multiple violent crimes are related to 
VMTCO operations and introduce the concept of second- and third-order effects of 
                                                 
328 Customs and Border Patrol Commissioner’s Situation Room Mexico Media Monitoring dated 
October 26, 2011.  
329 Texas Department of Public Safety, “Mexican Cartel Related Activity.” 
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spillover violence. At first glance, VMTCO recruitment of Texas school-age children330 
might not seem violent. Rosalio Reta was 13 years old when he was recruited and used 
by the Gulf VMTCO in Laredo, Texas as a VMTCO sicario.331 Yet, Texas gang 
affiliations and relationships also contribute to these second- and third-order effects 
through direct and indirect violent actions on behalf of VMTCOs.332  
Recommendations for definitions by the Southwest Border Task Force333 to the 
Homeland Security Advisory Council are synonymous with movement away from the 
term spillover violence but are still hinged on semantics rather than an analytical 
framework. The five definitions—criminal violence, border-related organized crime 
violence, violence against law enforcement agents, border violence, and spillover 
violence—also add more complexity and the recommendations are solely focused on 
spillover violence that comes from Mexico. The overall concept is still based on data 
submitted to the UCR program and will have the same methodological difficulties that 
currently exist. The task force recommendations recognize the importance of building a 
framework through metrics for capturing spillover violence away from the Southwestern 
border, which is in agreement with National Drug Intelligence Center statistics that place 
VMTCOs in over 1,000 U.S. cities. However, the distinction between border violence 
and spillover violence clouds the discussion and is reminiscent of rhetoric surrounding 
manifest destiny and the Mexican-American War when it mentions “violent acts that 
occur in the U.S.-Mexican territory.”334 Suddenly, there is no recognition of sovereign 
borders when discussing potential violence that helps support the claim that “there are no 
current examples of spillover violence.”335 Ignoring the political overtones, the task 
                                                 
330 On October 7, 2011, the Texas Department of Public Safety issued a statement that school age 
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force’s report does not consider VMTCO gun battles with other VMTCOs or the 
Mexican government in border towns adjacent to Texas.336 Gunfire from these battles 
crosses the border.337  
Finally, the recommended working definition for spillover violence includes 
intimidation by VMTCOs. Intimidation is a subjective term with no real tangible effect 
and is dependent on the person and the circumstance. Its foundation relies on anecdotal 
evidence and infers that such accounts be considered when establishing spillover 
violence. The reliance on a simple definition with no analytical framework or metric 
cannot capture intimidation used by VMTCOs. The definition becomes hollow, political 
rhetoric if there is or metric available to measure the impact of VMTCO violence crimes 
within this working definition. 
The myriad of definitions offer no real clarity on the issue of spillover violence, 
other than recommending different yet inclusive terms. The term spillover itself is the 
politicized term within this construct because of the accusatory tone it attributes with its 
use. This continues to cause turmoil at all levels of discourse and ignores the violence. 
None of the definitions collected within this thesis recommend a metric—other than UCR 
program—on how to statistically capture spillover, but do infer that investigative and 
intelligence driven law and military operations (like Operation Border Star) are needed to 
classify incidents. An analytical framework that includes investigative and intelligence 
driven operations are key to assigning valuable and tangible results while the UCR 
program, by itself, remains a distinctly deceptive metric used to categorize, not capture, 
spillover violence. 
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B. THE NEED FOR OBJECTIVE METRICS 
Neither methodology within the UCR Program maintains a definitive method for 
capturing spillover violence. How can a nationwide reporting methodology be expected 
to accurately capture spillover violence without a concrete and accepted definition? 
Neither lack of a definition nor a FBI warning that UCR data is not designed to rank 
regions stops its use within political discourse to assert conclusions about spillover 
violence.  
1. The Defacto Method 
According to the FBI, the Summary System “limits the reporting of offenses 
known to the eight selected crime classifications because they are the crimes most likely 
to be reported and most likely to occur with sufficient frequency to provide an adequate 
basis for comparison.”338 Defining Part I violent crimes—murder, rape, assault and 
robbery—does not necessarily translate into the most serious crimes nor does it include 
signature VMTCO involvement with kidnapping, corruption of public officials, money 
laundering or drug trafficking.339 Crimes that occur frequently enough for nationwide 
comparative analysis exclude major crimes associated with spillover violence by 
definition within the Summary System. Kidnapping, corruption of public officials, money 
laundering or drug trafficking are deemed too infrequent to catalog within the aggregate 
tallies of the Summary System. 
The Summary System is also incapable of examining complex relationships.340 
For example, the hierarchy rule encourages a one crime, one offense mentality and does 
not provide the systems-thinking perspective needed to address the complexities of 
organized criminal organizations. Relationships between murder and kidnapping or 
assault and corruption are not captured in the Summary System because they are 
prevented by the hierarchy rule. The Summary System is not designed to illuminate 
                                                 
338 The Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Uniform Crime Reports.” 
339 Drug trafficking is not to be confused with drug abuse in Part II crimes. 
340 Lesko, Uniform Crime Reports Program, 2. 
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intricate details of criminal behavior. Rather, it is an aggregate system and, by default, 
generalizes criminal activity into broad categories dependent upon nationwide trends for 
comparison. Spillover violence in this case, however, is tailored toward the Southwestern 
border, as well as cities with known VMTCO presence. The Summary System is not 
designed to collect data on specific criminal trends. 
Separating crimes into Part I and Part II categories is crucial in how they are 
reported within the Summary System to the UCR program. For violent crimes, one crime 
is reported for each person involved in the incident. If an intruder murders a husband and 
wife in their house, both murders are reported. However, if the intruder rapes the wife, 
but murders the husband, only the murder is reported because of the hierarchy rule.341 
For property crimes, one offense is reported to the UCR program for each incident, not 
necessarily each crime. For example, if a thief robs each in a group of four women in a 
parking lot, only one robbery is reported to the UCR program. However, if the thief 
robbed each woman and then stole one’s car, both one robbery and a motor-vehicle theft 
are reported to the UCR program.342  
Crimes most likely to be reported also pose a significant problem when discussing 
spillover violence and the Summary System. If a crime is not reported, it carries no 
statistical weight within the aggregate system and essentially does not exist. It is naïve to 
assume that all crimes centered on spillover violence are reported, especially when 
considering VMTCO involvement in lucrative human smuggling, extortion, corruption of 
public officials, and kidnapping. Targets of such crimes include illegal immigrants who 
may be unlikely to report criminal activity that include distrust of law enforcement, fear 
of deportation and inability to report a crime based on context, such as extortion or 
human smuggling.343  
Perception also plays a pivotal role in how spillover violence is reported. One 
Texas rancher along the Southwestern border claims “we see a lot of things, but we keep 
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our mouths shut about it…we just don’t want to be on anybody’s hit list.”344 This 
perception may be described as fear of VMTCO retribution and is based on powerful 
anecdotal evidence—that is, what is experienced and discussed amongst peers—rather 
than national criminal statistics. The end result is the same: U.S. citizens are affected by 
the threat or perception of spillover violence. Fear can be considered intimidation and is, 
therefore, considered spillover violence under new recommendations to the Homeland 
Security Advisory Council. 
Although the Summary System is the most common avenue for law enforcement 
agencies to aggregate and report crime, it has obvious complications that lead to 
subjectivity and omission of certain crimes. This is recognized in the law enforcement 
community and leads to a second method of classifying crime in NIBRS. The political 
discourse infers that VMTCO violence crossing the Southwestern border is an emerging 
threat within the homeland security era. Reliance upon the current UCR program to 
provide a realistic picture of the threat is outdated and requires an alternative analytical 
framework that accurately measures the VMTCO threat. 
2. An Alternative System 
NIBRS is intended to augment local law enforcement incident-based reporting 
systems allowing local agencies to develop needs-specific data within a respective 
jurisdiction.345 The original intent was to take advantage of available crime data secured 
in law enforcement record management systems, provide considerably more detail and 
yield more elaborate and functional data than the Summary System.346 TXDPS maintains 
switching to a NIBRS management system will capture spillover violence and provide a 
more accurate account of the VMTCO threat. NIBRS will capture a more accurate 
account of the crime because of the additional crimes it captures and the subsequent data 
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fields it requires, but that does not necessarily translate into capturing spillover violence. 
NIBRS will include such offenses as kidnapping and extortion that Texas maintains must 
be included when discussing spillover violence. This will provide a better picture of the 
circumstances surrounding the crime, but lends no statistical weight toward spillover 
violence. Texas, however, can develop its own data fields within the state incident-based 
reporting system to reflect the spillover violence category. For example, the Association 
of State Uniform Crime Reporting Programs released a survey of additional data 
elements identified by various NIBRS state programs (Table 6).347 Texas can create a 
field for violence attributed to VMTCOs within NIBRS. 
 
Association of State Uniform Crime Reporting Programs NIBRS Survey 
Domestic Violence Sexual Assault 
Hate Crimes Suicide 
Vehicular Homicide Crimes Against the Elderly 
Drug Labs Carjacking 
Canine Injured/Killed in the Line of Duty Anti-Reproductive Rights Crimes
Table 6.   Association of State Uniform Crime Reporting Programs NIBRS Survey 
3. Intricacies Between the Two 
A logical assumption defines the violent crime within the UCR program as either 
a Part I or Group A offense. Two methods of inquiry surrounding the Summary System 
and NIBRS offenses are warranted. The Summary System reports murder, forcible rape, 
burglary and aggravated assault. A person murdered by a VMTCO sicario348 will register 
one murder, but there is no statistical methodology for capturing the crime as spillover 
violence within the Summary System even if law enforcement attributes the murder as 
such. Property specific to spillover violence crimes may not be captured (with the 
exception of arson) because of the hierarchy rule. This assumes a property crime by itself 
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does not constitute violence (even if associated with a simple assault). If a home is 
burglarized by a VMTCO member looking for weapons—a common complaint by Texas 
ranchers living in border communities349—only a property crime is entered into the 
Summary System and it can be argued that no violent act occurred. The reliance on 
definitions of spillover violence alone fails to account for these kinds of VMTCO violent 
crimes and posits an argument for an analytical framework that provides data in a 
systematic and realistic manner. 
There are several additional violent crimes captured within NIBRS including 
kidnapping, abduction, all assaults and sexual offenses, and NIBRS does not honor the 
hierarchy rule. Working from the assumption that violence may be used alongside other 
offenses, additional Group A offenses are captured including weapons violations (the 
Summary System only collects weapons information for murder), extortion, burglary, 
larceny and drug offenses (including trafficking). Each crime will register as a separate 
offense. NIBRS requires 52 additional data elements on each offense350 that may help 
identify the crime as spillover violence. However, there is still no statistical methodology 
for capturing the crime as spillover within NIBRS even if attributed as such by law 
enforcement. 
UCR data—in particular data inputted from the Summary System—is the main 
method of chronicling nationwide criminal activity and has become a general indicator of 
planning, budgeting, and community safety in terms of future criminal threats.351 It is, 
therefore, logical to assume UCR data provides an aura of credibility when discussing 
criminal matters. The UCR program has not migrated fully to accepting the NIBRS 
methodology despite its superiority in capturing general crime and instead relies on the 
Summary System. Over 90% of the U.S. population is represented by law enforcement 
agencies that are submitting Summary System data, not NIBRS, and NIBRS has quite 
some distance before full implementation. Even Texas translates (classifies) and tallies 
                                                 
349 McCaffrey and Scales, Texas Border Security: A Strategic Military Assessment, 24–25. 
350 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, How Crime in the United States is 
Measured, 51. 
351 Lesko, Uniform Crime Reports Program, 2. 
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(scores) submitted NIBRS data into the Summary System before submitting to the UCR 
program. Until the FBI receives a majority of data in NIBRS format, it will continue to 
use the Summary System as a benchmark for reporting national crime statistics.352 
Therefore, when UCR data is paraded within the political discourse it is important to 
remember the rules and reporting mechanisms by which it is regulated. 
The basis of the UCR program relies on crimes known to law enforcement. By 
definition, it does not account for crimes that are not reported which distracts from the 
accuracy of the UCR data. A violent crime not reported is still a violent crime, but neither 
known to law enforcement nor reflected in the statistics.  
The UCR program maintains checks and balances for inputting data, but cannot 
control the accuracy of the individual filing the report. The accuracy in filing a report is 
not deemed as valuable by law enforcement officers as the work that went into stopping 
the crime.353 A transition to the NIBRS system amplifies the problem, as more data 
elements are required when filing the report and requires more time and attention.354 This 
also fuels concern that NIBRS will lead to elevated crime statistics, whether related to 
database entry or actual crime, which can be a public relations nightmare.355 It is 
certainly not within a city mayor or police chief’s interest to announce that violent crime 
is on the rise. From the mayor’s perspective, this projects dangerous conditions exist 
within the community and is bad for tourism and business. From the police chief’s 
perspective, it maintains law enforcement efforts are incapable of maintaining order. 
Accuracy of the UCR program cannot control either of these subjective influences. 
Using publically accessible UCR data familiar to a majority of municipalities 
plays well into the political discourse, but does not necessarily provide a realistic picture. 
The current data only captures four violent crimes and is not necessarily inclusive 
depending on the applications of the reporting system and requirements, such as the 
hierarchy rule. Texas maintains VMTCO procedures garnered from intelligence-driven 
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operations like Operation Border Star add several violent crimes to the equation. Low 
violent crime rates espoused by Secretary Napolitano during visits to Texas border 
communities are not necessarily reflective of violence along the border. As mentioned, 
the El Paso MSA shows an increase in violent crimes since 2006 despite Secretary 
Napolitano’s claim that is going down. El Paso Mayor John Cook acknowledges there is 
spillover violence, but says it is rare.356 The UCR program uses different methodologies 
to capture violent crimes and its understanding is crucial in gaining a realistic picture of 
violence in a community. The restraints in current violent crime reporting methodologies 
further fuel the political discourse surrounding VMTCO violence across the 
Southwestern border. An analytical framework based on objective metrics specific to this 
threat must be used as VMTCO violence becomes center stage as an emerging threat to 
the homeland security project. Otherwise, the political narrative will continue to base its 
agenda and rhetoric upon inaccurate and misleading statistics. 
C. PUTTING REALITY TO USE ON THE BORDER  
The United States and Texas have contributed massive resources to the 
Southwestern border in the last several years and there are now more federal resources on 
the border than ever before.357 Texas has followed suit with a collaborative law 
enforcement effort, driven by intelligence, in Operation Border Star. The success of 
Operation Border Star offers a different threat picture for the Texas border and 
encourages viewing spillover violence in a larger context. State issued warnings to law 
enforcement concerning gun battles in border towns adjacent to Texas between VMTCOs 
or Mexican government forces are a mainstay.358  
VMTCO involvement with illegal entry of special interest aliens through human 
smuggling and affiliations with terrorist organizations remain a credible threat. Drug, 
                                                 
356 John Burnett, “’Spillover’ Violence From Mexico: Trickle or Flood?,” NPR, July 6, 2011, 
http://www.npr.org/2011/07/06/137445310/spillover-violence-from-mexico-a-trickle-or-flood. 
357 Department of Homeland Security, “Secretary Janet Napolitano, before the Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: “Securing the Border: Progress at the Federal Level.”” 
358 The Texas Fusion Center, in coordination with BSOC and JOICs, releases information to law 
enforcement agencies concerning ongoing battles between VMTCOs and government forces. 
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weapons and cash seizures show no sign of decreasing.359 Corruption remains a concern 
and has warranted the full attention of the FBI along the Texas border.360 Operation 
Border Star suggests that traditional involvement with drug trafficking is no longer the 
only threat VMTCOs pose to the Texas border. Each potential threat presents second- and 
third-order possibilities of violence that is traceable to VMTCOs. 
The resource allocation pool directed toward border operations from the federal 
government and Texas must factor into the viability of the VMTCO threat and 
subsequent spillover violence. Comparing UCR data from the Summary System in Texas 
with the 10 most violent cities in the United States for 2010 supports the notion that the 
border is far more secure than U.S. inner cities (Figure 17).  
 
 
Figure 17.   Ten Cities with the Highest Violent Crime Rates Compared to Texas  
                                                 
359 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime 
and Global Counterterrorism, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, Alien 
Smuggling, DHS Could Better Address Alien Smuggling along the Southwest Border by Leveraging 
Investigative Resources and Measuring Program Performance by Richard M. Stana, (GAO-10-919T), 
Washington, DC: GPO, 2010, 1. 
360 The new Special Agent in Charge of the San Antonio FBI Field Office, Armando Fernandez, lists 
border corruption as a top priority. 
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Ironically, Lubbock, Texas makes the list as the fifth most dangerous city per 
100,000 persons based on four violent crimes known to law enforcement. Reviewing 
UCR data by itself ignores the resources and financial commitment put forth through 
federal programs and Operation Border Star. Rather than use UCR data to claim the 
border is more secure now than ever before, ask how many military and law enforcement 
resources are dispatched to the Texas border per 100,000 persons to combat the VMTCO 
threat. Operation Border Star dedicates ground, air and marine resources based on 
concrete problems, all of which have ramifications to spillover violence. Intelligence and 
experience on VMTCO capability recommend the state insert shallow water interceptors 
—gunboats—along the border. How are these contemporary resources financially 
justified and operationally warranted if spillover violence is an exaggerated claim and the 
border is more secure now than ever before? Such details are not reflected in UCR data, 
but are debated and discussed within the same political circles that request and allocate 
the funds to support Operation Border Star. The resources committed by the federal 
government and Texas lend validity to the argument that the border is not secure. 
The discourse appears to work both ways. Texas claims the rural border regions 
saw a significant reduction in “index crimes”—meaning, Summary System Part 1 data—
due to the implementation of border operations.361 Governor Perry’s reelection campaign 
stated the federal government was not doing enough for border security. Therefore, Texas 
secured funding for border operations and the results have a produced a 65% reduction in 
violent crimes between 2005 and 2007.362 Data used to support the 65% reduction comes 
from the Summary System and excludes major Texas towns. As a result, Texas claims, 
“additional local law enforcement initiatives are needed that are singularly focused on the 
reduction of violent border crime” to ensure lasting results.363 The UCR data in this case 
is used to support a political platform (crime is going down) and a call to arms (more 
resources are needed) and is a prime example of how the data can be manipulated. 
                                                 
361 Perry, Texas Homeland Security Strategic Plan 2010–2015, 40. 
362 Taken from Governor Perry’s 2008 campaign website 2008. “Perry Governor,” (n.d.), 
http://www.rickperry.org/. 
363 Perry, Texas Homeland Security Strategic Plan 2010–2015, 40. 
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Operation Border Star demands that a view of spillover violence from a systems-
thinking perspective. Using spillover violence as a singular determinant of border 
security is not reflective of strategic thinking. Violence is an obvious tangible threat of 
VMTCO activities along and within the border. Military capability, ties to terrorist 
organizations, corruption, kidnapping and extortion used together with violence exhibit a 
much greater strategic threat. Operation Border Star represents how second- and third-
order effects of spillover violence can result from activities like gang affiliation, juvenile 
recruitment into VMTCOs, and human smuggling. These second- and third-order effects 
may not represent outright signs of violence on the front end, but will remain issues of 
the future. 
D. FRAMING THE ISSUE 
Spillover violence has become a political lightning bolt within the discourse 
surrounding border security, community stature on both sides of the border and 
enforcement efforts. The scope of spillover violence has divergent meanings that polarize 
the discourse and affect the narrative on the true threat. There is no congruent definition 
that shares responsibility for the growing threat from VMTCOs and the term suggests a 
one-way path into the United States. The discourse will continue to deteriorate around the 
social construct that frames the discussion as no one definition alone can capture the 
emerging and dynamic VMTCO threats. Rather than another definition to describe what 
spillover violence may or may not entail, a congruent analytical framework is needed that 
captures the full impact of VMTCO violence and activities with research-based objective 
metrics.  
Operation Border Star and the UCR program represent how national metrics must 
be amended to include actionable findings tailored to a specific threat. UCR data has 
morphed into the methodology used to document and clarify spillover violence in border 
communities, but analysis highlights the inaccuracies and deception of using this data as 
a singular determinant. More information is needed to clarify the situation. 
Data reviewed in Operation Border Star indicates that all aspects of border related 
violence continue to increase despite the enormous efforts put forth by the federal and 
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state governments. While this shows progress and success in the initial stages, it also 
signifies a sustained and evolving threat. Increased resources along the border do not 
necessarily translate into safer communities. The VMTCO threat and subsequent violence 
that crosses the border is growing and it will take more resources to effectively combat 
future trends. Operation Border Star represents a targeted approach to combating 
VMTCO activity along and within the border and the systems-thinking perspective 
needed to comprehend the actual and potential effects of spillover violence. Combining 
targeted approaches like Operation Border Star with research-based objective metrics will 
help form an analytical framework that accurately gauges the VMTCO threat and 
violence coming across the Southwestern border. 
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V. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 
What we’ve learned is that the evidence of where a war is going begins 
with anecdotal evidence. You don’t wait for the statistics to be rolled 
out.364 
– U.S. Army Major General Robert Scales (ret) 
Violence is occurring in Texas as a result of the Mexican drug war and the 
discourse is focused on semantics rather than reality. The Texas-Mexico border is not 
immune from violence, but it is not exactly a war zone either. The political discourse has 
a unique way of framing the narrative to fit an agenda, and in this case, is using national 
crime statistics from the UCR program to make its point. This thesis argues removing the 
focus on definitions and replacing it with an analytical framework that is based upon 
research and realistic metrics that enable policy makers to make informed decisions that 
protect the Southwestern border and increase American awareness of the emerging 
VMTCO threat. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The thesis set out to answer two research questions concerning the framework of 
spillover violence and the metrics used to capture it and, through analysis, makes two 
recommendations: 
1. Remove the bias of “spillover violence” and migrate toward an analytical 
framework outside political agendas that encompasses “cross-border 
violence” and a critical analysis of emerging threats posed by VMTCOs in 
a systematic manner.  
2. Use the analytical framework to transition to a NIBRS methodology with 
tailored data categories specific to cross-border violence that is based upon 
intelligence-driven engagements like Operation Border Star. 
                                                 
364 Jeremy Schwartz, “Report Cites Anecdotes to Show Spillover Border Violence,” statesman.com, 
September 26, 2011, http://www.statesman.com/news/Texas-politics/report-cites-anecdotes-to-show-
spillover-border-violence-1881101.html. 
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B. RE-FRAMING CROSS-BORDER VIOLENCE 
Terminology is affecting the discourse between nations, states and cities. 
Spillover violence is not an accurate term politically or geographically. Politically, the 
term focuses blame for increased violence from the Mexican drug war solely upon 
Mexico, and takes no ownership of how it is occurring. The United States has committed 
$1.4 billion in funding initiatives through the Merida Initiative in attempt to help stop 
VMTCO violence and keep it from spreading. Law enforcement and judicial reform, 
increased intelligence sharing, and military weaponry and training are just a few of the 
programs aimed at curbing the threat posed by VMTCOs.365 Yet, violence is rampant 
throughout Mexico and crossing a shared border. The political discourse conveniently 
side steps the U.S. contribution to the problem in the form of drug demand, gang 
affiliations, corruption, and weapons and cash smuggling. This shared responsibility 
helps fuel the drug war and violence throughout both nations is a result. 
Geographically, violence does not change meaning after crossing a shared border. 
The violence is not tolerated in the United States as it is in Mexico, and the VMTCOs 
understand this concept quite well. If VMTCOs were not rational organizations that 
understood this underlying prohibition, this research suggests that many Texas cities 
would experience the beheadings and mutilations currently taking place just across the 
border in Mexico. If VMTCOs confronted U.S. law enforcement or military forces as 
aggressively as they do in Mexico, the result would end poorly for them as the 
competency level of U.S. forces is significantly greater than their Mexican counterparts. 
Additionally, research suggests that although corruption of U.S. officials is certainly 
present, VMTCOs have not had the same success corrupting U.S. officials as they have  
 
                                                 
365 The Four Pillars of Merida, Public Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy Mexico City. Efforts 
include technology enhancements to law, military and border security; maritime shipment interdiction 
efforts; curtailing the illicit flow of products and people across the border while increasing legitimate 
economic efforts; increase infrastructure; and, strengthen community resilience and restore trust and 
confidence through job programs, youth engagement programs, and expanding “social safety nets.” 
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with their Mexican counterparts.366 However, corruption is rising along the border and 
changing the dynamic that only Mexican officials are susceptible to VMTCO corruption 
efforts.367 
Simply changing the terminology does not solve any of the issues that need to be 
addressed. Rather than focusing on politically charged frames for understanding the 
issue, both countries should form a collaborative effort in confronting cross-border 
violence. Progress could be made through an educational platform at the international, 
national and state levels to establish an understanding and agreement on how cross-
border violence is defined and measured. Mexico’s experience allows it to use specific 
parameters for measuring VMTCO violence, particularly homicides, related to the drug 
war.368 Synonymous methods of categorizing incidents attributed to VMTCOs may be 
utilized by both Mexico and the United States and tailored to current trends indicative of 
ongoing violence to portray a more accurate picture of what is really happening.  
However, the new narrative toward a shared responsibility will not sit well with 
some in the political arena who claim the United States is not at fault for violence 
stemming from the Mexican drug war. A simple counter-narrative questions why 
VMTCOs are exponentially increasing business operations within the United States. The 
United States wants something the VMTCOs have (e.g., drugs) and is willing to pay a 
premium. Implementation begins across all levels of government and starts with 
strategies to combat cross-border violence gleaned through intelligence driven operations 
between the two countries. 
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Cross-border violence is a more accurate frame that indicates shared 
responsibility, removes the notion that either country is solely at fault369 and admits the 
violence is caused on both sides of the border. Creating an analytical framework attempts 
to move the political discourse into a more meaningful direction that better compliments 
the law and military enforcement resources in place to combat the threat and allows the 
focus to remain on reality, not political grandstanding. 
Operation Border Star is one example of how an analytical framework can be 
applied. Operation Border Star monitors and measures VMTCO activities crossing the 
shared border in both directions through a network of Joint Operation Intelligence 
Centers (JOICs) that measure violent activities throughout the U.S.-Mexico border 
regions. The Border Security Operation Center (BSOC) analyzes this raw information for 
similarities both within Texas and Mexico, and develops finished intelligence products 
that enable appropriate decision making capabilities.  
The analytical framework relies on incident details specific to VMTCO trends in 
Texas and Mexico, rather than generalized crime categories and rules, through a 
systematic method that is shared throughout Texas. The framework can be reproduced for 
other Southwestern border states, and the federal government, and produces effective 
data on the threat independent of any political narrative.  
C. THE NATIONAL INCIDENT BASED REPORTING SYSTEM (NIBRS) 
AND INTELLIGENCE DRIVEN ENGAGEMENTS 
The UCR program is a national, recognized metric for providing crime statistics 
and a favorite for “proving” how safe the border is from violence. However, analysis 
reveals that the current UCR Summary System is not only an inaccurate methodology, it  
 
                                                 
369 Mentioned within the literature review, Mexico blames the violence on lax U.S. gun control laws 
and an insatiable appetite for drugs (demand) while the U.S. blames Mexico for an inability to curtail drug 
supply and violence. 
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is also deceptive.370 A new narrative is needed that transitions to a form of NIBRS 
methodology while incorporating intelligence driven engagements like Operation Border 
Star. 
Capturing cross-border violence within a confined metric is difficult. The TXDPS 
claims switching to NIBRS will assist in identifying cross-border violence, but this is an 
unfounded claim without more research. The research within this thesis has shown that 
including all crimes of murder, assault, kidnapping, rape, threats against law and military 
enforcement, as well as reclassifying the crime of torture within NIBRS, will more 
effectively capture the impact of cross-border violence, and allow a more effective 
evaluation of policy and enforcement needs. The research also recommends a 
concentration on any established nexus to VMTCOs including second- and third-order 
effects like U.S. gang affiliations and recruitment, extortion; corruption, drugs, weapons 
and cash movemen, and intimidation. Establishing a nexus is important for cross-border 
violence; it sets parameters for violence that occurs away from the border, and 
distinguishes routine violence from inter- and intra-VMTCO rivalries, as well as those 
with government forces, and allows the framework to capture incidents away from the 
border as these organizations increase in presence throughout the United States. 
The research within this thesis indicates that a true metric for claiming cross-
border violence must include an intelligence component that can assert a nexus to 
VMTCO activities and argues that Operation Border Star serves as one example. Texas is 
successful in combating the VMTCO threat, as well as second- and third-order effects of 
cross-border violence, and maintains the statistics to argue success based on what the 
research recommends—through intelligence—rather than upon a political narrative 
steeped in ideology. However, there is no stand-alone metric that will account for cross-
border violence without providing a “check this box here” option within NIBRS. Even  
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so, it still demands an intelligence and investigative component to assert the VMTCO 
nexus. Combining an index methodology like NIBRS with state-tailored data elements 
provides a formal metric. 
NIBRS is an operational methodology, but no data will be accepted into the UCR 
program until a majority of agencies submit data in NIBRS format.371 Agencies are not 
using NIBRS because there is concern it will result in higher crime indexes and 
implementation costs.372 NIBRS by design records more crime. Not only does NIBRS 
collect more data about each crime, it also collects more crime because it is not subject to 
the confines of the hierarchy rule in multi-offense crimes. This provides a more accurate 
picture of crime within a community and a better understanding of cross-border violence. 
However, there is concern that recording more crimes translates into higher crime rates 
that may not sit well with police chiefs, town mayors and local politicians.373 Inflated 
crime rates, independent of real crime, may not be good for job security, business, 
livelihood or tourism.374 
A review by the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics found that 
violent crime rates between the UCR Summary System and NIBRS differ by less than 
1%.375 Murder rates between the two systems remain the same, but NIBRS reports less 
than 1% higher for aggravated assault, rape and robbery. Areas with lower crime in 
general experience exaggerated changes with removal of the hierarchy rule and need to 
rely on actual numbers rather than percentage differences.376 The assault category is 
important because NIBRS counts aggravated assaults, simple assaults and intimidation 
separately,377 which become important when discussing cross-border violence. The crime 
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index is only a statistical representation and allows the political discourse to construct a 
more appropriate narrative for the community. Crime itself does not rise by switching to 
NIBRS, only the value in the data and how it is received by the public.378 
Switching to NIBRS may also involve cost. Agencies that participate in NIBRS 
must have computerized data systems capable of processing NIBRS data.379 That 
presents tangible problems for agencies that still rely on manual reporting mechanisms or 
do not yet report into the UCR program. According to the research, there is no way of 
estimating the costs associated with switching to a NIBRS format.380 There are costs in 
design and implementation, server requirements, support staff, maintenance and training, 
and all will vary greatly between agencies depending on current operational capability.381 
Although grant funding for NIBRS implementation is not currently available,382 taking a 
collaborative approach in educating policy makers and community members (who pay 
the taxes) about the true benefits of NIBRS will improve future local, state and federal 
funding options. 
The community is the most important part of the collaborative environment. 
Victims of crime come from the community. When an intruder breaks into a house, 
murders the husband and rapes the wife only one crime offense is recorded in the current 
Summary System because of the hierarchy rule.383 Therefore, citing violent crime rates 
compiled with Summary System data is both inaccurate and deceptive. Violent crime is 
not trending down if the rape and burglary (listed as a violent crime) are not counted in 
the referenced statistic. 
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The VMTCO threat requires a new analytical framework that captures VMTCO 
violence and activities based on intelligence-driven operations. VMTCOs are dynamic 
organizations and will evolve their procedures as the enforcement effort changes. 
Therefore, the analytical framework itself becomes dynamic because it is based on 
objective, research-based metrics. 
Research presented within this thesis argues that there is no clear methodology 
used to classify cross-border violence. There are two major findings within the current 
system—the UCR program—that affect the political narrative when it comes to cross-
border violence. First, there are no metrics in place within the system to directly target 
VMTCO violence; rather, crimes are segregated into general categories in attempt to 
capture those that are “most likely to occur.”384 There is also a level of subjectivity 
involved in how violent crimes are inputted into the UCR program.385 Ultimately, this 
may lead to inaccurate positions within the political discourse.386 
Second, all violent crimes might not be recorded depending on the circumstances 
of the incident due to the rules of the system, such as the hierarchy rule.387 Therefore, this 
thesis argues that lack of an analytical framework to place VMTCO-related violence into 
context leads to inaccurate claims of cross-border violence and severely limits its efficacy 
within the political discourse. 
The political narrative surrounding cross-border violence should adopt an 
analytical framework that can be used to accurately describe the threat of cross-border 
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violence. Operation Border Star represents a targeted approach to combating VMTCO 
activity along and within the border and the systems-thinking perspective needed to 
comprehend the actual and potential effects of cross-border violence. It also supplies 
objective metrics that are based on cooperative intelligence efforts that accurately depict 
dynamic and emerging VMTCO threats. 
An analytical framework based on objective metrics provides for a congruent 
political narrative that encompasses the full scope of VMTCO violence—including 
second- and third-order effects—and appropriately frames the discourse around an 
emerging homeland security issue. 
D. FINAL THOUGHTS: GLOBALIZATION AND A STRATEGIC LOOK 
FORWARD 
The daunting realities of terrorism and transnational crime, when wedded 
together, are quite alarming. Despite our apprehensions, it is evident that 
nations have little choice but to act together in order to frustrate the spread 
of these social viruses.388 
Mexico is a long-term ally with the United States and the two countries are 
intertwined in many economic trade policies, as well as the tourism industry. NAFTA 
was instrumental in encouraging trade and investment between the United States, Mexico 
and Canada. Signed on January 1, 1994, the agreement formed a trilateral hegemon that 
remains the largest international economic agreement in the world.389 Open borders and 
tourism are top priorities of the current U.S. and Mexican administrations. Unfortunately, 
these parameters also allow the propagation of illicit VMTCO activities. Following the 
theory that globalization causes insecurity,390 the violence and terrorism tactics utilized 
by VMTCOs in Mexico will begin to increase in regions outside Mexico. 
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VMTCOs are testing the internal security of Mexico as the drug war fuels hyper-
violence throughout the country. Violence will continue to increase as VMTCOs struggle 
for control of lucrative smuggling routes within the United States, Mexico and Central 
America. Drugs are now only one of the VMTCOs’ many business interests and the 
violence stems from territory control, not necessarily a specific commodity. The majority 
of the violence in Mexico occurs in its northern states391 along the U.S. Southwestern 
border and is framing political narratives in the form of national security concerns.392 An 
analytical framework can provide objective information that might prove valuable in this 
context of national security concerns. However, how could a comparatively small group 
of VMTCOs threaten the national security of two nations? This threat to security might 
be founded in subjective, albeit, irrational terms.393 VMTCO size, in terms of traditional 
nation-state threats to national security is not important; rather, it is the perceived 
insecurity the threat causes to the local populace and policy makers. VMTCOs are 
accomplishing this through an ideology that includes assassinations, torture, beheadings, 
corruption, access to and proficient use of military weapons, and communication through 
social media and public messaging within Mexico, along the Southwestern border and 
into the United States.394  
As globalization promulgates Mexico’s international economic position, 
VMTCOs will attract more business and their violent tactics will receive more attention. 
The violence in Mexico is extremely public and, thus far, VMTCOs show no sign of 
retreating or revising tactics. Since globalization in western societies is largely an 
economic threat,395 VMTCOs will continue to protect their business interests as well. 
Mexico’s history proves that VMTCOs become increasingly hyper-violent when their 
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monopoly is challenged given over 50,000 deaths since the inception of President 
Calderon’s military campaign that began in 2006.396 To date, the United States operates 
under the assumption that VMTCO violence has not and will not cross into the United 
States simply because it is not within their business interests to challenge U.S. military or 
law enforcement efforts.397 This only fuels our “tendency to look for evidence to support 
out prior expectations instead of being open to other possibilities”398—and is known as a 
confirmation bias in the literature399—which significantly increases U.S. risk within the 
global security construct. 
While these threats are predominately felt in Mexico, they are spreading and 
affecting its northern and southern neighbors. VMTCOs are rapidly expanding within the 
United States; since the National Drug Intelligence Center 2008 annual report, the United 
States has experienced an approximate 450% increase in VMTCO presence.400 Joint law 
enforcement operations like Project Coronado401 are becoming common, span multiple 
states far from the Southwestern border, and are fueled by millions in cash.402 VMTCOs 
are also increasing operations in Central American countries like Honduras and 
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Guatemala.403 The non-permissive U.S. environment and Mexican military operations 
are pushing VMTCOs into Central America where territory struggles continue for control 
of vital land and sea ports. The influx of VMTCO operations and business model has 
“devastating consequences for Central America, including spikes in violent crime, drug 
use and the corroding of government institutions.”404  
In South America, Mexico signed the Pacific Alliance on June 6, 2012 with 
Colombia, Peru and Chile. The alliance is meant to “more deeply integrate their 
economies and develop new trade links with the Asia-Pacific region”405 and is a prime 
example of globalization and Mexico’s attempt to have a part in U.S.-China dominated 
East Asia economic trade. The irony of a relationship with Colombia is not lost, as it is 
the world’s second largest cocaine producer behind Peru and home of the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) foreign terrorist organization.  
VMTCOs are also rapidly expanding in North and South America, Southeast 
Asia, Africa and Europe and are outsourcing their modalities to existing illicit 
infrastructures requiring an international effort to combat the threat.406  
Cross-border violence will continue to challenge the United States and Mexico 
until a viable solution is found to combat the growing VMTCO threat. Collaborative 
intelligence driven enforcement operations between the United States and Mexico will 
provide a formidable barrier along the shared border until the political discourse can 
break from its aberration of assigning blame and work toward a solution within the global 
construct.  
As VMTCOs expand globally, the United States can learn from its successes in 
dealing with violence in Colombia in the later part of the 20th century and beginning of 
the 21st century. The rising power of drug traffickers and their use of hyper-violence and 
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terrorism resulted in a shifting U.S. strategy under President Clinton407 during the final 
implementation stages of Plan Colombia.408 The change in strategy included an 
additional $1.3 billion aid package aimed more toward reducing drug trafficking and its 
associated violence409 rather than the original intent of providing social and economic 
reform to rural areas410 while reducing crop supply.411  
U.S. involvement is credited with improving the internal security of Colombia 
and severely weakening drug trafficking organizations, as well as the FARC foreign 
terrorist organization.412 Testimony before Congress claims public safety has improved 
and cites between 2002 and 2004, “homicides have fallen by 30 percent, massacres (the 
killing of three or more persons at one time) by 61 percent, kidnappings by 51 percent, 
and acts of terrorism by 56 percent.”413  
In a working paper to be released from the Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars’ Mexico Institute, el Colegio de la Frontera Norte, and Arizona State 
University’s North American Center for Transborder Studies, the authors argue: 
The state of security along the U.S.-Mexico border easily ranks as one of 
the most highly charged topics of public discussion and debate in both the 
United States and Mexico of the past several years. Concerns about global 
terrorism, potential threats posed by those entering the United States  
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illegally, and fears that skyrocketing violence in Mexico might “spillover” 
into the United States have led to dramatic policy shifts and significant 
new investments by the U.S. to “secure” the border.414 
This research shows that hyper-violence emanating out of Mexico is infusing the 
political discourse within both the homeland and national security constructs and quickly 
escalating into global concerns of much more than drug trafficking alone.415 The 
resultant narratives are driven by inaccurate metrics and are in need of an analytical 
framework that successfully deals with the full scope of the problem. Such a framework 
based on objective metrics demonstrated herein can inject the discourse with data on 
global terrorism trends, special interest alien entry, and cross-border violence incidents, 
and enable decision makers a realistic threat picture with which to make the important 
decisions on protecting the homeland. 
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2009 Southwest Border Task Force Recommended Definitions of Violence 
TYPE DEFINITION EXAMPLE 
Criminal Violence The criminal use of force or 
threat thereof occurring within 
the United States, as reported by 
state, local, tribal, or federal law 
enforcement agencies 
 
Offenses involving force or the threat of force: as measured by the FBI Uniform Crime 
Reports (UCR). UCR currently includes four offenses: murder and non-negligent 
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.  
 





Any act of violence that takes 
place in the United States with 
links to cross-border crime such 
as drug, arms, cash, and alien 
smuggling/trafficking. 
Violent abduction by human-trafficking organization that takes place away from the 
SWB. 
 
Killings carried out by gangs involved in drug distribution away from the SWB. 
Violence against Law 
Enforcement Agents 
Any act of violence carried out 
against a U.S. federal, state, 
local, or tribal Law Enforcement 
Agent, in association cross 
border crime, but not organized 
or directed by a TCO. 
“Rockings” (rock throwing)against U.S. Border Patrol 
 
Vehicular Violence against U.S. Border Patrol 
 
This category would also include violent acts associated with resisting arrest by federal, 
state, local and tribal law enforcement; as well as those carried out by illegal migrants 
being repatriated by Border Patrol and ICE agents.  
 
It would not, however encompass offensive violence as directed by TCO leadership, as 
discussed below.  
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2009 Southwest Border Task Force Recommended Definitions of Violence 
TYPE DEFINITION EXAMPLE 
Border Violence Any act of violence which takes 
place, within 25 miles of the U.S. 
side of the border, which has 
links to cross-border crime such 
as drug, arms, cash or alien 
smuggling/trafficking or illegal 
migration 
Automobile-related violence associated with human smuggling 
 
A violent act that crosses the U.S.-Mexico border, or spans U.S.-Mexican territory  
 
Violence between drug traffickers bringing loads into the United States  
 
Spillover Violence Violence that starts in Mexico as 
part of a conflict among cartels 
or between cartels and the 
Government of Mexico that 
carries over onto U.S. territory or 
threatens U.S. personnel or 
interests in Mexico 
There are no current examples of spillover violence 
 
A proximate example would be a situation like that which occurred in Laredo, TX in 
2005. At that time, a turf war between cartels in the Mexican city of Nuevo Laredo 
resulted in the deaths of 60 Mexican citizens over 6 months, and the kidnapping or killing 
of 30 Americans south of the Border. Concurrently, Laredo officials reported that on the 
U.S. side of the border, businessmen were being threatened by drug gangs demanding 
protection payments. Two homicides occurred in Laredo that involved suspected members 
of Mexican drug gangs, including one in which a deputy sheriff was shot and wounded by 
a suspect carrying an AK-47 assault rifle.  
 
Sinaloa cartel boss Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, has instructed associates to use deadly 
force, if needed, to protect trafficking operations north of the border. The message was 
allegedly delivered by Guzman in March to a gathering of associates in Sonoita, Mexico, 
south of the Arizona border.  
 
In the event that DHS observed evidence of a strategic campaign of violence—directed by 
a transnational criminal organization—to intimidate U.S. citizens, law enforcement 
agents, or public officials on U.S. territory, this would be classified as spillover violence. 
No such evidence exists, to date, though DHS contingency planning efforts currently 
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